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Many developing countries cannot provide their population with proper medical care or access to 
medication. International trade intends to assure peace and prosperity, and to increase access to 
desired products. Consequently, international trade should be able to help solve the problem of 
insufficient access in underdeveloped nations. This „simple‟ equation is complicated by the fact that 
the developed world seem to be convinced that innovation is a necessity for economic development 
and prosperity. Industrialized nations believe in a legal system with strong and enforceable 
intellectual property rights that ensures inventors profit as an incentive for further research and 
innovation. This perception is generally not shared by the developing world, where most countries 
consider relaxed intellectual property regimes a necessity for development. Developing countries 
generally lack the necessary resources to develop their own intellectual property, but still desire 
access to lifesaving drugs. An obvious approach to improve this global health problem would be to 
keep prices on medication to a minimum. This is where the conflict between the promotion of 
global health and protection of intellectual property begins. If manufacturers of pharmaceuticals are 
not provided with a period of limited competition, they do not have an equally strong incentive to 
develop new medications. Restriction in competition is very likely to cause higher prices than if the 
pharmaceuticals were subject to free competition. The crucial international policy question is how 
to manage the tradeoff between higher prices today, in exchange for innovation tomorrow. The 
TRIPS agreement and its minimum requirements for IPR protection can be seen as an attempt to 
compromise this conflict within the multilateral WTO trade system. It is however quite evident that 
the compromises have not been satisfactory to either the industrialized or the developing world. 
Many developing countries argue that the regulation does not emphasize development enough and 
that TRIPS values profit over health protection. They therefore strongly advocate that health shall 
be recognized as a human right.  
 
This debate has pushed the WTO towards a more health-friendly interpretation of its trade 
agreements, for example by allowing a broader use of compulsory licenses for lifesaving drugs, 
which allows the WTO member to set aside the commercial interests of the patent owner, in order to 
provide its population with a social benefit. A specific declaration on TRIPS and Public Health has 
also been issued, emphasizing that TRIPS should not prevent WTO members from taking measures 
to protect public health, and that this should be a guiding principle to TRIPS interpretation.
 
Consequently it is obvious that pressure from the developing world has pushed the WTO to 
reinterpret TRIPS into a more health-friendly agreement than before.  
 
The increased health focus in the multilateral sector has given many developed countries an 
incentive to enter into bilateral trade agreements that just add IPR provisions on top of the 
requirements from multilateral agreements. This way developed countries can take advantage of 
their bargaining powers and push harder IP rights without the restrains of multilateral treaty-making 
within the WTO. This development, called the TRIPS-plus strategy, is a serious threat to the success 
and credibility of multilateral cooperation within the WTO, and has the potential to seriously 
undermine the steps taken towards a more global health oriented world. The greatest upcoming 
challenge for the WTO will be how to treat the trend of bilateralism without losing any members, or 
its status as a strong international organization. No doubt, innovation can provide development and 
IPR protection does provide an efficient way to achieve innovation. But considering how the profit 
incentive so profoundly interfere with promotion of global health, it must be possible to find a 
compromise in order to promote global health and innovation at the same time. If health had the 
status of a human right and equal enforceability of a civil right, measures necessary to protect 
global health would easily trump profit incentives. This would require strong safeguards so that 
health protective measures never become a cover up for trade protectionist measures. Primarily, in 
order to create sustainable trade liberalization, the wealth and economic growth that innovation 
provides should be invested into development and promotion of global health. 
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1. Introduction  
In a world where globalization has evolved from a theoretical model into an unstoppable process, 
international trade and economic integration are crucial parts in the attempt to stabilize world order. 
Through globalization a lot of issues that used to be subject only to national policy, have been given 
increased global impact and therefore gradually created a need to regulate on an international level. 
The two policy areas of interest for this thesis are trade and health. The economic benefits of 
liberalizing international trade through the removal of barriers to trade are long since recognized. 
Some even believe that trade liberalization is the primary tool for social and economic 
development. Simultaneously the issue of public health has been highlighted as a public good and is 
even considered by many as a human right. The result of this increased awareness is a wide, 
complex and ever-growing body of international cooperation and regulation regarding as well 
international trade, as international public health.  
1.1 Topic motivation  
There is an inherent conflict between liberalized trade and public health that can aggravate the 
simultaneous fulfillment of these goals. With a free market world order, there is always the issue of 
the profit motive over trumping the interest of global health. An illustrative example is the epidemic 
of the infectious disease of HIV/Aids. Drugs against infectious diseases have extremely high 
development costs compared to expected financial return. Countries that require access to this kind 
of drugs the most, generally do not have the competence to develop the drugs themselves, nor the 
resources to import them. Pharmaceutical companies want a return on their investments and are 
more likely to develop lifestyle drugs over lifesaving drugs. This means that the public health 
interest of providing poor countries with access to medicine s is threatened by the liberalization of 
trade in drugs. A feature of today's industries that makes the situation even more complex is the 
protection of IPRs in pharmaceuticals. The developed world claims that IPR protection is necessary 
to promote innovation and that without innovation there would be no drugs at all. Through the 
WTO and the TRIPS agreement, IPR protection has become an integral part of international trade 
law. The main part of the world is now obliged to follow the regulation and its requirements of 
minimum protection for IPRs. Even though the WTO opens up new development possibilities for 
the developing world through increased market access, strong IPRs make it very hard for 
developing countries to adhere to its obligation to protect health.  
 12 
 
1.2 Regulatory background  
The most striking conflict between IPR protection and global health promotion is that TRIPS 
prevents the supply of generic copies of a new drug. If the drugs needed to fight a disease are 
protected by strong IPRs, it is even more expensive for developing countries to import the drug, to 
obtain a license to manufacture the drug. The WTO has gradually become more aware of this 
conflict and has tried to compensate for this obstacle in the fight for public health. One attempt 
towards a more health protective approach has been to allow compulsory licenses during public 
health emergencies, such as the HIV/Aids epidemic. This opens up the possibility for companies 
manufacturing generic drugs to be able to provide more affordable medicine. Initially, this 
possibility was limited to domestic use, which meant that a manufacturer was unable to export 
generic drugs under a compulsory license. The problem with this solution is that most LDCs do not 
have the resources necessary to make use of a compulsory license by themselves. The Doha 
Declaration initiating the latest and current round of WTO negotiations took this a little bit further 
and declared that export of products made under a compulsory license, may be exported to LDC's. 
1.3 Problems  
The urgent public health question is however if these latest measures are enough. For one thing, 
there is an uncertainty to the legal standing of the results from the Doha round so far. The relevant 
declaration is not yet formally ratified as an integral part of the WTO system. The biggest issue is 
the fact that many of the industrialized nations are pushing for even stronger international IPRs. 
Many believe that developing countries, during the Uruguay round leading up to the WTO, were 
basically forced to agree to the TRIPS agreement in order to get access to all the other advantages 
that the WTO could offer. The current negotiation round within the WTO was supposed to be more 
focused on the developing countries, the role and consequences of IPR protection was supposed to 
be back on the agenda. Despite the longest round of negotiations so far, real success is yet to come. 
Progress is most likely delayed by the fact that most developed countries consider the multilateral 
IPR protection offered by the WTO to be too weak, contrary to the goal of the Doha agenda. In fact, 
many large and influential industrialized nations have chosen to enter into a so called TRIPS-plus 
strategy, using their unequal bargain power to enter into bilateral agreements with small developing 
countries and thereby imposing even stricter IPRs through a country-by-country approach. The 
complexity of the conflict adds on when taking into account the fact that all evidence suggests that 
it is very hard to achieve maximum development potential with strong IPR protection. Basically all 
current industrialized nations became industrialized with almost no protection for new and 
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increased innovation so that they could innovate as much as possible. So they question really comes 
down to if it is possible to combine liberalized trade with strong IP rights, and still expect the kind 
of social and economic development necessary to fulfill the goals and obligations of  international 
public health agreements.   
1.4 Problem statements and purpose of thesis  
With these dilemmas, complicated relations and versatile considerations in mind, the main purpose 
of this thesis is to analyze the following problems: 
(1) What role does global health promotion play in global development;  
(2) Can developing countries reach their development potential with strong international 
agreements on IPR protection; 
(3) Has the multilateral remedies implemented to comply the TRIPS agreement with protection 
of global health had any impact – if so, what kind; 
(4) Has the recent trend towards a bilateral TRIPS-plus strategy counteracted multilateral 
attempts for IPR protection to co-exist with the promotion of development and global 
health; and  
(5) Is it possible to regulate trade and IPR protection so that it contributes to sustainable trade 
liberalization? 
1.5 Method  
The research method for this thesis is a relatively traditional legal dogmatic approach with 
interdisciplinary features due to the highly political nature of the topic. The primary sources have 
been relevant international agreements, publications from the WTO and other international 
organizations, as well as a wide range of as well legal as political doctrine. 
1.6 Disposition  
For a better overview of the relevant issues, the thesis is divided into 5 different parts Due to the 
complexity of the topic, the first parts are quite comprehensive. The intention is to give the reader a 
thorough understanding of the background to the conflict and all factors that impact the relationship 
between the policies.  
 Part I, the introductory chapters 2-4, provides a theoretical and contextual framework for 
the thesis. It gives an overview of both motives, goals and potential downsides to 
international trade and trade agreements, followed by a an introduction to globalization and 
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development and how these concepts are influenced by trade liberalization as well as an 
introduction to how important promotion of global health really is. 
 Part II, chapter 5 and 6, introduces the concept of health as a human right, international 
cooperation and agreements on promotion of global health, the connection between the 
WTO and global health and a brief introduction to the TRIPS agreement.  
 Part III, chapter 7-10, gives a closer look on the TRIPS agreement and why it is a potential 
conflict to global health promotion. It also describes the rationale behind IPR protection, 
how IPRs are connected to trade and how they became a regulatory matter within the WTO.  
 Part IV, chapter 11-13, closer describes the impact the TRIPS agreement has had on 
developing countries in general and the health of their populations in particular developing 
world and how the WTO has tried to reconcile TRIPS and global health protection. It also 
presents the recent development towards a TRIPS-plus strategy and compares the strengths 
and weaknesses of multilateral and bilateral cooperation.  
 Lastly, in part V and chapter 14, the findings from previous chapters are discussed and 




PART I  
2. International trade 
There are many aspects and theories on the effects and consequences of international trade; positive 
as well as negative. This chapter provides a brief introduction to the basic arguments from both an 
economic and a political point of view.  
2.1 Comparative advantage and other economic benefits of trade 
From an economic perspective, trade is thought to increase economic well-being, welfare and 
income. Economic evidence for these positive effects of trade is mainly based on the theory of 
comparative advantage which suggests that cross-border trade borders increases the overall income 
of a country.
1
 According to this theory a country has a comparative advantage “in producing a 
good, if the relative cost of producing the good, that is, its opportunity cost in terms of other goods 
forgone, is lower than it is abroad.”2 Countries tend to export goods they have a comparative 
advantage in and import goods they do not have a comparative advantage in.
3
 Basically this means 
that if a nation opens its borders to trade, available production possibilities will increase, which 
allows the country to specialize in the production of those goods and services in which it has a 
comparative advantage.
4 
In addition to the increase in overall welfare for both trading parties, 
international trade also provides a more efficient distribution of resources and creates economies of 
scale.
5
 When a nation opens its borders for trade to flow freely, competition generally increases and 
creates lower prices on products, which is beneficial for consumers.
6
 Tariffs on imported products 
on the other hand, protect domestic companies that would otherwise face competition and raises 




2.2. Non-economic advantages of trade 
Economic advantages aside, trade can: improve friendly relations between nations; reduce the 
                                               
1 Page 10, Guzman/Pauwelyn 
2 Page 69, Oxford Dictionary 
3 Page 69, Oxford Dictionary 
4 Page 13, Guzman/Pauwelyn  
5 Page 30, Guzman/Pauwelyn 
6 Page 18, Guzman/Pauwelyn 
7 Page 495, Rivera-Batiz/Oliva 
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likelihood of armed conflict; stimulate stability, freedom and democracy; contribute to cultural 
exchange and enable technology transfer.
8
 If trade can create these advantages, why is it that 
countries do not open their borders completely and allow free flow of products? If the economic 
impacts of trade are this positive, why do governments still adhere to protectionist measures and 
barriers to trade?  
2.3 Arguments against free trade 
Even though free trade and comparative advantage can contribute to growth and economic 
development, it does not promise a fairly distributed increase of income.
9
 To create a 'just' system, it 
is necessary to redistribute resources. The theory of comparative advantage also generally assumes 
that workers can be easily replaced into where they are most useful.
10
 Consequently, one common 
argument against trade is that countries want to protect domestic industries and the jobs that they 
offer and thereby be able to correct distributional effects.
11 
Along with the desire to protect domestic 
jobs comes the intention of protecting wages. In many developed countries there has also been 
some resistance towards trading with developing countries, because of a fear that such a trade 
would drive down the salaries in the developed countries.
12
 Generally this point of view is refuted 
by statements saying that the amount of trade with developing countries is too small, or the 
importance of imports from developing countries is not significant enough to make an impact on 
domestic wages in developed countries.
13
 Other common domestic objections to liberalized trade 
origin in a desire to address domestic market failures, protect infant industries from international 
competition, improve a country's own terms of trade or collect revenue to the government through 
the use of tariffs, protection from imports that are seen as a threat to a nation – either by being a risk 
to health, environment, national culture, security or public moral and so on.
14
  
2.4 Politics over economic theory – protectionism  
Regardless of political views, it is fairly accurate to say that economists are virtually unanimous 
that international trade is beneficial to growth and essential for sound economic policies.
15
 The fact 
that governments still keep barriers to trade despite this fairly sound economic theory is probably 
                                               
8 Page 30, Guzman/Pauwelyn 
9 Page 10, Guzman/Pauwelyn  
10 Page 16, Guzman/Pauwelyn 
11 Page 30, Guzman/Pauwelyn  
12 Page 96, Rivera-Batiz/Oliva 
13 Page 96, Rivera-Batiz/Oliva 
14 Page 30, Guzman, Pauwelyn 
15 Page 42, Guzman/Pauwelyn 
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easiest explained by political pressure. It is important to remember that politics and policies of trade 
do not necessarily correspond with what is thought to be the most advantageous solution according 
to economic theory, there are many other aspects to consider in policy making.  
2.4.1 Collective action and free riding  
A collective good, or a public good, is something that, when provided to a group, all members enjoy 
equally.
16
 One would think that the more people that would gain from a collective good, the harder 
the public would work a policy assuring this good. The reality is that due to the problem of 
collective action, small and well-organized interests groups generally have a disproportionate 
influence over policy compared to the large, unorganized mass that would benefit more from a 
certain policy. The economist Mancur Olson explains this by referring to the nature of collective 
goods - the larger the group, the smaller the individual gain.
17
 Since everyone gains equally from a 
collective good regardless of contribution, large groups generally suffer from a free riding 
problem.
18
 This means that the group will suffer from the people who rely on others to contribute 
and just join in for the free ride. In a small group, the individual gain can be much greater and 
thereby an incentive for greater individual sacrifices when trying to achieve the benefit, which also 
limits the possibility of free riding.
19
   
2.4.1.1 A collective action problem in trade 
The problem of collective action and free riding is true also when it comes to trade. Liberalized 
trade could create the collective good lower consumer prices. Unfortunately consumers make up a 
large and poorly organized group, and the respective individual gain for each consumer is so small 
that they are unlikely to care enough to fight for lower tariffs on trade. A domestic company with a 
more or less un-threatened market position with barriers to trade on the other hand, risk losing a 
great deal on increased competition. Lobbyist groups that represent this industry that risks facing 
serious competition without protective measures, is generally sufficiently well-organized and 
politically influential to be able to steer policy towards more protectionist measures, compared to 
the unorganized consumers.
20
 The fact that governments can be influenced by interest groups does 
not mean that social welfare is not a political goal, only that consumers have a much harder time 
communicating what would enhance their social welfare.
21
 It should of course be noted that far 
                                               
16 Page 466, Canon, Coleman, Mayer 
17 Page 467, Canon, Coleman, Mayer 
18 Page 468, Canon, Coleman, Mayer 
19 Page 469, Canon, Coleman, Mayer 
20 Page 495, Rivera-Batiz/Oliva 
21 Page 528, Rivera-Batiz/Oliva 
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from all consumers believe that trade liberalization should be a prioritized goal for the government 
even if they realize the effect of lower prices. For example, a consumer might doubt the government 
ability to control the distributional effects that that increased competition will have and if 
consumers believe that trade is hurtful to them, the government will act protectionist regardless of 
economic arguments. Hence, there is an inherent tension between the economic incentives to 
liberalize trade and reduce trade barriers on the one hand and political pressure for protectionism on 
the other hand.  
3. International trade agreements  
Since the Second World War the world has seen a dramatic decline in tariffs and trade barriers as 
well as a dramatic increase in trade.
22
 The connection between these events is clear.
23
 Free trade 
agreements such as GATT and later the free trade organization WTO with its many trade related 
agreements have been the two main contributors to the dismantling of tariffs, but they have not put 




3.1 Why liberalized trade through international agreements? 
A government that does not cooperate with other nations is likely to try to improve its own position 
in the market and try to gain a competitive advantage by adopting trade barriers and export 
subsidies. If all countries only sought to enhance its own market position like this, a situation called 
the prisoner's dilemma is very likely to occur. In this scenario no single country gains a market 
advantages; instead all countries impose high tariffs and export subsidies and everyone loses.
25
 
Governments that are aware of the costs that trade restrictions can bring, have a great incentive to 
cooperate and coordinate trade policies with each other.
26
 Multilateral and bilateral negotiations 
regarding trade liberalization through the reduction or elimination of trade barriers in the global 
economy have taken place since the 1940's.
27
 Historically international trade has been liberalized 
gradually through several rounds of negotiations. The fact that liberalization is gradual and not 
immediate can be explained by the costs associated with adjustments, as well as a country's desire 
                                               
22 Page 411, Rivera-Batiz, Oliva 
23 Page 1 Guzman/Pauwelyn 
24 Page 411, Rivera-Batiz, Oliva 
25 Page 518, Rivera-Batiz/Oliva 
26 Page 552, Rivera-Batiz/Oliva 
27 Page 418, Rivera-Batiz/Oliva  
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to avoid abrupt changes in income distribution that new competition may bring about.
28
 An 
underlying motive for these negotiations has been the possibility of the optimal economic 
conditions that free trade under perfect competition can bring.
29
 The goal of these negotiations is 




3.2 The GATT  
In 1947, the signatures from 25 governments created the first multilateral agreement ever devoted to 
set principles for international trade and to coordinate trade opening among its members.
31
 This was 
the creation of GATT, an agreement on trade in goods. GATT was the result of a failed attempt to 
create a world agency for trade as part of the Bretton Woods plan to stabilize the global financial 
situation by the creation of the World Bank and the UN.
32
  The UN council ECOSOC initiated the 
establishment of an International Trade Organization, ITO, which lead to a series of negotiations 
resulting in the adoption of GATT at the UN Conference on Trade and Employment in 1948.
33
 The 
ITO never became reality, which meant that GATT was given the part of both a trade agreement, as 
well as a substitute for the intended organization.
34
 GATT was created because of an international 
desire to avoid trade losses in forms of optimal tariffs for individual countries, because countries 
wanted to make a commitment against domestic interests, and finally to pursue foreign policy on 
peace and security.
35
 The most important reason to its creation was likely a desire to dissolve a 
number of protectionist trade policies that had been built up during the economic depression in the 
1930's.
36  
The completion of GATT initiated a series of negotiations called rounds with the goal of 
eliminating barriers to trade. All of the eight negotiation rounds that the GATT sponsored produced 
a binding trade liberalization agreement signed by all members.
37 
The latest completed round of 
negotiations was the Uruguay round. This was the longest round of negotiations, 1986 to 1994, but 
it also brought about the greatest change by creating a new multilateral trade agency – the WTO - 
that completely replaced the institutional structure of the GATT.
38
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3.3. The WTO  
The end of the Uruguay round resulted in the Marrakesh Agreement, also called the WTO 
Agreement, establishing the free trade organization WTO in January 1995. The WTO replaced 
GATT as an international organization, but the GATT still exists as the WTO's umbrella treaty for 
trade in goods. 
3.3.1 What is the WTO and what does it do?  
The WTO is a multilateral trade organization of permanent character that deals with the rules of 
international trade on a global level.
39
 The organization has legal personality
 
and the same 
international status as the IMF and the World Bank.
40 
With 153 members across the world, the WTO 
and its agreements cover a significant portion of the global trade.
41
 The main purpose of the WTO 
system is to “help trade flow as freely as possible – so long as there are no undesirable side-effects 
– because this is important for economic development and well-being.”42 To fulfill this purpose the 
WTO provides an institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its members in 
matters related to the WTO agreements and related legal instruments.
43
 The framework facilitates 
the implementation, administration and operation of the WTO agreement and its annexes as well 
provides a forum for trade negotiations for its members regarding both existing agreements, as well 
as potential future agreement.
44
 A crucial feature of the WTO system that makes it stand out from 
almost all other international cooperation is that it is equipped with a strong dispute settlement 
mechanism that simplifies the possibility to effectively enforce the obligations of its agreements. 
This dispute settlement process is governed by the DSU and provides a solution if, and when, 
member states find themselves in a dispute regarding the interpretation of any of the WTO 
agreements. 
3.3.2 Agreements of the WTO 
Originating from the GATT, which only dealt with trade in goods, the WTO has developed 
tremendously and its agreements now cover everything from trade in goods and services, 
agriculture, intellectual property, clothing, banking and more. The three main areas of regulation are 
trade in (1) goods, (2) services, and (3) intellectual property. Each of the three main areas is 
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respectively governed by the three WTO cores agreements GATT, GATS and TRIPS. These three 
agreements are annexed to the WTO agreement, making them an integrated and legally binding part 
of the WTO agreement.
45
 Membership into the WTO is one single undertaking so anyone who 




3.3.3 Structure of the WTO  
The leadership of the WTO derives from its members.
47
  The highest decision making authority lies 
with the Ministerial Conference that consists of minister representatives from all members. The 
Ministerial Conference meets at least every two years and has the highest responsibility to carry out 
the functions of the WTO, and take the actions necessary.
48
 In between the Ministerial Conferences 
the General Council are in charge of carrying out these responsibilities.
49 
The Council also consists 
of representatives from all members, but generally on a lower level such as ambassadors or 
delegates. Hence, all major decisions within the WTO are entered into by all members jointly and 
usually through a consensus process where each member has one vote.
50
 Apart from these bodies, 
the three core agreements, GATT, GATS and TRIPS, all have respective councils that, with 
guidance from the General Council, oversee the function of the agreements.
51
  
3.3.4 Fundamental principles of the WTO 
Despite the wide range of subject areas governed by the agreements under the WTO scope, there are 
some fundamental principles that can be found throughout all of the agreements and that provide 
the agreements with a sense of unity and base for the multilateral system.
52
 The most foundational 




(1) the most favored nation (MFN) principle, which mean that members cannot discriminated 
against its WTO trading partners - any concession made to another WTO member must 
immediately apply to all other members as well; and 
(2) the principle of national treatment, which means that any imported goods or services from 
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Besides these fundamental principles, the WTO core principles also advocate a gradually freer trade 
through negotiations; predictability through binding and transparency; promotion of fair 
competition, as well as encouragement of development and economic reform.
55
  
3.3.5 Other relevant features of the WTO 
An important characteristic that made the WTO successful enough to attract 153 members, is the 
'reciprocal exchange of market access concessions', which basically means that through the WTO, 
governments can open up new markets for its domestic exporters and thereby overcome pressure 
from domestic lobbyists rooting for trade barriers to protect its industries from competition.
56 
The 
WTO system is producer driven by favoring export politics over import politics, it is completely 
mercantilist, and the system also has a tendency to mistrust domestic politics with a general belief 
that national parliaments would regress to protectionism without the rules of the WTO.
57
 It is also 
important to remember that the WTO is not a completely uncontroversial organization. Many have 
questioned its motives and instruments to liberalize trade, especially when it comes to protection of 
the interests of developing countries. The fact that the WTO has given out a publication with 
statements that the WTO claim are common misunderstandings about the WTO, says a lot about the 
extent of these concerns.
58
 In the publication the WTO contradict such claims as: that WTO 
advocate free trade at any cost; that commercial interest take priority over development and that the 
WTO dictate governments on issues such as food safety, human health and safety.
59  
4. Globalization and development 
In order to properly analyze the consequences of international free trade agreements it is important 
to have an understanding of the concepts globalization and development. Free and liberalized trade 
is crucial components in the globalization process that highly influence countries' development 
potential. Since countries development is also highly dependent on the health of its population, any 
strategy to promote global health must also take the effects of liberalized trade and globalization 
into consideration.  
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4.1 What is globalization? 
Globalization is a term used widely and often without a definition. If a definition is provided it is 
often vague and unspecific and can be anything from a very broad, such as “arrange of processes 
that is changing the boundaries that separate human societies from each other and can lead both to 
interconnectedness and new divisions”60, to more specific, such as “a strategy of development 
based on liberalization of markets and the assumption that free flow of trade, finance and 
information that will produce the best possible outcome for economic development.”61 The Oxford 
Dictionary of Economics simply describes globalization as “the process by which the whole world 
becomes a single market”, meaning that “goods and services, capital and labor are traded on a 
worldwide basis, and information and the result of research flow readily between countries”.62 
Regardless of how one chooses to define the process or strategy of globalization, it is clear that it is 
here to stay. Technology or information cannot be confined within borders, the interdependence 
between nations regarding trade is enormous, and the global economic integration is only 
expanding. There really is no way of turning back the process, only to try to identify its effects and 
consequences and try to handle it from there. It is also evident that globalization is not new 
phenomena, but compared to previous periods of globalization, today's has a whole different 
breadth, speed and intensity of movements.
63
 The WTO, with its liberalizing trade agreements, has 
been very influential to this process. It is however a long way to go before the world economy is 
completely globalized. Restricted mobility in labor and an underdeveloped infrastructure in most 
LDC's are the current main obstacles to economic globalization, so technically only the rich and 
industrialized countries can truly be called globalized.
64
  
4.2 What is development?  
The meaning of the term 'development' is in no way clearly defined and is used in a number of 
different way by scientists, experts and organizations to explain a wide range of situations or 
processes. To make it a bit clearer, development is commonly divided into three categories: (1) 
economic development; (2) human development; and (3) sustainable development.
65 
Sustainable 
development is not the focus of this thesis, but for informational purposes, it is seen as a supplement 
to economic and human development by also taking into account environmental aspects into the 
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4.2.1 Economic development and trade liberalization 
In the economic context, development describes a country's measurable economic performance 
relative to the performance of other countries.
67
 Economic performance can with advantage be 
measured in growth, which is defined as “an increase in an economic variable, normally persisting 
over successive periods.”68 Examples of measurements in growth that is fairly easy to comprehend, 
is growth in GDP or growth in income. So how can free trade enhance economic development? 
When perfect competition prevails, free trade is considered the best policy, but when international 
trade takes place in imperfectly competitive markets with other trade distortions, appropriately 
imposed trade restrictions can in principle, but not necessarily, improve trade restrictions.
69
  
4.2.1.1 Innovation and knowledge as a part of economic development 
Many countries believe that innovation, the creation of knowledge and intellectual property, is a 
crucial factor to the creation of economic growth and wealth, mainly because original and exclusive 
knowledge is something that is crucial to be a strong international competitor on any market.
70
 If 
this is true, it is not farfetched to believe that cross-border access to knowledge and information 
exchange will be crucial components in international economic development.
71
  There is also a 
general belief in developed countries that a transformation from an economy based on production 
and “real” property, into an economy with higher focus on innovation of intellectual property, 
requires a highly developed protection and enforcement for IPRs.
72
 When it comes to innovation, 
patent rights are the most important IPRs and the industries in research and development strongly 
advocate that patent protection is crucial to innovation and development of new products.
73
 This 
type of protection of IPRs is not exactly uncontroversial in terms of its impact on development and 
will be examined in more detail further down in this thesis.  
4.2.2 Human development  
Some consider economic growth to be a sufficient measure of the development of a nation or 
region. Another perception is that other factors than pure monetary ones must be taken into account 
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in order to get a more comprehensive and thorough picture of development. Human development 
can be seen as a supplement to economic development by also taking social welfare considerations 
into account when measuring development.
74
 Instead of only measuring economic growth, it has 
been advocated to measurement through HDI as a better indicator of development.
75
 The HDI 
measures a country's average achievements in human development by dividing it into three 
dimensions: “a long and healthy life; knowledge; and a decent standard of living.”76 This index has 
both a component that measures income in form of GDP per capita as well as a non-income 
component that measures things like life expectancy, literacy and the number of children enrolled in 
school.
77 
The UNDP defines human development as “creating an environment in which people can 
develop their full potential and lead productive creative lives in accord with their needs and 
interests”.78 With this kind of definition, development entails so much more than economic growth 
and focus is instead on the process of increasing human choices. In order to be able to make choices 
and make decisions for oneself, a human being must have the most basic capabilities for 
development, that is to be able to “lead long and healthy lives, to be knowledgeable, to have access 
to the resources needed for a decent standard of living and to be able to participate in the life of the 
community.”79 In 1992, the UNCED announced The Rio Declaration80 for future global sustainable 
development, which was the first time the international community acknowledged a 'right to 
development'.
81
 The concept is very vague and is most likely a compilation of international 
obligations as well as both collective and individual human rights, but nevertheless it is still 
recognition for the need of development.
82
 Hence, human development is closely intertwined with 
the realization of human rights; the two concepts interact and help realize each other.
83
  
4.3 The need for development – actions and recipients 
With approximately 1 billion people in the world that live on less than 1 dollar a day as well as 2 
out of 5 humans that live on less than 2 dollars a day, there is an obvious need for both economic 
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 Countless international efforts are being made to try to accomplish this 
development through different international organizations and agreements. The progress that these 
programs and efforts have had is not to be dismissed lightly. The WHO world health report from 
2008 give an illustrative example through the mortality rate in children; if the current number of 
child deaths would have been as high as it was in 1978, there would have been 16.2 million deaths 
globally in 2006 - the real number was 9.5 million deaths, illustrating a number of 18 329 saved 
lives every day.
85
 The problem is though that this progress has not been distributed equally over the 
globe. The decline in child mortality has unfortunately been much lower in low-income countries 
than it has been in rich countries.
86
 With more than a third of child deaths caused by malnutrition 
and statistics showing that one in four children in developing countries are underweight
87
, the 
connection is not too hard to understand. It is evident that all improvements that have been made in 
the area of global health has been very unequal where some parts of the world have made great 
progress, while other parts have simply stood still or even regressed.
88
   
4.3.1 Developing countries and progressive realization 
Even though international agreements generally place obligations equally on all its members, the 
world recognizes the increased need for development in certain poor and underdeveloped countries.  
Almost all international agreements that provide obligations acknowledge this special need, 
recognize the need for progressive realization and therefore often provide developing countries with 
extended time limits to comply with the provisions of the agreement.
89
  The division between 
developed and developing country is based on the principle of self selection, which means that it is 
the country itself that decides if it should be classified as a developing or a developed country.
90
 
This also means that another country can contest to the classification if they do not believe that a 
country should be given the benefits that a developing country receives in the international arena.
91
 
The poorest countries on earth, the LDCs, are recognized by the UN and are given additional 
provisions to comply with international obligations.
92
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4.4 International initiatives for development  
As a matter of enormous urgency, it is no wonder that a number of strategies are in action to fight 
poverty, infectious diseases and increase the economic well-being of the world's population.  
4.4.1 The Millennium Development Goals  
During political and economic reforms between 1980's up until 2000 – world leaders committed to 
eradicate poverty
93
. This was soon followed by the UN Millennium Summit establishing the MDGs 
in combat of poverty, hunger, disease and many other factors that impacts development. The 
commitment to these goals is probably the most significant attempt towards global development and 
an actual sincere attempt to address the problems of inequality and poverty. New financial 
mechanisms of development were offered and the UN and G8 took an initiative to fight three 
specific diseases that are a major cause of low life expectancy in huge parts of the developing 
world.
94
 The MDG initiative really brought put the issue of inequality into focus of international 
social policy-making and with global health as a main objective.
95
 It also helped authorities in the 
health area to expand the understanding of the concept of health. The MDG's do not define health as 
narrow as increased disease control and higher survival rates; they treat health also as a necessity of 
life, highly valued in society.
96
  
4.4.2 UNCTAD  
One important organization in the work for development in a globalized world is the UNCTAD, 
established in 1964. The mission of this UN agency is to promote “development-friendly 
integration of developing countries into the world economy.” and its work is mainly focused on 
ensuring that “domestic policies and international actions are mutually supportive in bringing 
about sustainable development.”97 The UNCTAD collects economic data and analyze development 
strategies with the purpose of providing the international community with a better understanding of 
how to handle the effects of globalization.
98
 To communicate the results of its work, the UNCTAD 
annually publishes a Trade and Development Report. As a contribution to the international debate 
on globalization, UNCTAD also has a program on Globalization and Development strategies where 
it promotes policies for economic growth and development by  regularly examining the “trends and 
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prospects in the world economy” and “undertaking studies on the requirements for successful 
development strategies and on the debt problems of developing countries.”99  
4.4.3 UNDP 
Another important UN agent for development is the UNDP, the UN network for global development 
that advocates for change and help provide countries with the knowledge, resources, and experience 
necessary to be able to achieve increased development. The UNDP has a crucial role in coordinating 
efforts to reach the MDGs and offer nations help with: the buildup of democratic governance, 
reduction of poverty, prevention and recovery from a crisis, governance of environmental, energy 
and HIV/Aids challenges, and assist developing countries on how to attract and use international aid 
effectively.
100
 For a long time, the developed world has seen aid as the primary measure to assist 
any countries in need. According to the WHO, global aid will still play a role in the assurance of 
progress and development in the future, but one that is highly supplemental and secondary to 
exchange, joint learning and global governance.
101
  
4.4.4 Corporate Social Responsibility 
Apart from state cooperation through agreement and international agencies, it has also become more 
and more common with large multinational companies to be more active in their CSR measures. For 
example, in 2004 Coca Cola agreed to treat all their African employees infected with HIV with 
ARV drugs on the expense of the company.
102
 Another example can be found in some 
pharmaceutical companies that lowered their prices on ARVs after pressure from different 
organizations such as the UNAIDS.
103
  
4.5 Impact of globalization and trade liberalization on development 
It is controversial what impact globalization and trade liberalization has on the poor population in 
developing countries and scholarly evidence point in many directions. Some researchers find that 
there is no evidence suggesting that open international trade has a significant negative impact on the 
income of poor, while others claim that an open international trade led to a higher inequality.
104 
The 
connections are not entirely clear, but since trade liberalization is probably only going to be more 
and more extensive, it is important to learn the effects of it and try to enhance its benefits, and 
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reduce any potential concerns.  
4.5.1 Trade liberalization as an instrument to reach development 
The considerable amount of research that identifies liberal trade as a positive instrument, indicate 
that liberalized trade promote development and social welfare through the reduction of poverty and 
the increase of overall personal wealth.
105
 This means that restricted trade does not provide an 
optimal allocation of resources and is costly to welfare. Costs to welfare can be calculated very 
statically by simply measuring the gap between price and marginal cost due to trade restrictions on 
the one hand, and the elasticity of demand and supply and the volume of trade on the other hand; 
generally through a percentage of a nation's GDP.
106
 Trade restrictions can also create distortions to 




4.5.1.1 Example from trade liberalization in developing countries  
In the 1980s there was a debt crisis in many developing countries that made way for a wave of trade 
liberalization.
108
 China, India, Brazil, Thailand, Argentina and Bangladesh (six globalizing countries 
that together account for over half of the population of the developing world) all sharply reduced 
tariff rates and increased trade in relation to their GDPs in the 1990's.
109
 The relation between trade 
liberalization, growth and national poverty in these six globalizing countries was examined in an 
economic study by Dollar and Kraay where the main conclusion was that trade liberalization 
accelerated both the growth rate and the rate of poverty reduction.
110
 The study showed that the 
average income of the poorest 20% of a country on average fall or rise at the same rate as the 
average income falls or rises.
111
 This research was based on numbers from a time period over 40 
years and they found this to be true in all regions and income levels as well as in normal times or 
times of crisis. Their research also found that economic policies that were pro-growth (such as a 
low inflation, respect for the rule of law and openness to international trade) in general raised 
average income without any systematic distributional effects.
112
 Most significantly, their research 
indicates that an openness to trade on average increases the income of the poor to the same extent as 
any other household. Consequently their research supports the view that liberalized trade decrease 
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poverty and thereby contributes to development. Dollar and Kraay do not suggest that increased 
growth is the only measure necessary to improve poverty, but since their research demonstrate that 
economic growth on average benefit the poor equally to the rest of society, they believe that any 
strategy to reduce poverty should be dedicated to create an increased growth.
113 
WTO supports this 
point of view with research stating that average life expectancy has risen as a reflection of the 
growth in average income per capita.
114 
 This is further supported by the UN MDG report of 2009, 
stating that the recent global economic crisis increased the anticipated number of people living in 
extreme poverty in 2009 by 55 to 90 million people globally.
115
  
4.5.1.2 Other prerequisites for development  
Growth and economic development is dependent on diffusion of technology and the capacity of a 
country to command new technologies.
116
 Globalization of scientific knowledge and diffusion of 
technology could have positive implications for health for example by distance learning for poor 
and remote communities.
117
 In order to be able to enjoy the economic and social development that 
diffusion of technology could bring, most developing countries need to improve their technological 
base.
118
 Information technology is a powerful force in both social and economic development and it 
is therefore highly important to improve developing countries capacities to be able to use this 
technology.
119
  Globalization of trade also enhances the importance of international standards and 
legal instruments, introducing for example obligations regarding food safety or other standards that 
could improve the health of a population.
120
 “Good governance within each country and at the 
international level is essential for sustained economic growth and development.”121 Policies and 
instruments in a development strategy, such as macroeconomic tools, trade and education policies, 
as well as investments in infrastructure are all closely intertwined and interact with each other. 
Finally, it is also a matter of security. A country in peace is much more susceptible to growth than a 
nation of conflicts.
122
 According to the WHO, a civil war reduces the growth of a country with 
approximately 2.3% per year for a typical duration of seven years, resulting in a country that is 15% 
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4.5.2 Trade liberalization in conflict with development and health improvement?  
Despite a number of benefits, there are both winners and losers as a consequence of the 
distributional effects of globalization. It is clear that global change affects individuals and 
populations differently depending on their socioeconomic status.
124
  
4.5.2.1 Inequality, lack of resources and exposure   
Globalization has actually led to a widening of income inequality. Average income in already high-
income countries increase faster than average income in low-income countries which consequently 
lead to higher disparities between the most and the least healthy.
125
 Both individuals in less 
developed parts of the world, as well as their governments lack the material resources to do the 
investments necessary to protect health.
126
 By definition, globalization opens up borders, which 
makes people more exposed sensitive to health threats. Open borders lead to an increased risk of 
infectious diseases spreading faster and wider because no nation can contain within its own 
premises.
127
 Open borders also allow harmful products, such as tobacco, to spread into new parts of 




4.5.2.2 Impact on power structures  
Globalization also affects the power structures of the world. On the one hand it is fairly obvious that 
a more interconnected world places more power in the hands of fewer people, and on the other hand 
globalization may have a democratizing effect through a positive impact on development.
129
 
Healthy and informed people have a better chance of influencing their everyday life. Another issue 
regarding power is that globalization and trade liberalization reduces state involvement in the 
economic integration. It limits possibilities for governmental subsidies for example health policies 
and weakens state influence.
130
 
4.5.2.3 Is economic growth and development really connected?  
While doing research for the UNDP, economists George Gray Molina and Mark Purser found that 
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changes in the income based and the non-income based parts of the HDI are not related and thereby 
caused huge disturbance in the generally accepted view that human development will follow 
economic growth.
131
 The two researchers tracked changes in income and non-income components 
of the HDI separately. Their results indicate that the enormous achievements in health and education 
has had next to nothing to do with globalization and that the credit instead should go to 
governmental decisions to expand education and health systems, as well as international efforts to 
increase access to vaccines and antibiotics.
132
 Their conclusion was that economic growth and 
human development are not enhanced by the same forces, and that acceleration in life expectancy 
and literacy as a result of urbanization and declining fertility rates, is driven by individual and 
household decisions about fertility and female schooling.
133
  
4.5.3 Conclusions on the relationship between trade and development 
Due to power shifts, overlapping mandates, competition, poor coordination and governance and so 
on, the world has seen a shift from a predominantly vertical power to a more horizontal phase; it is 
not only cooperation between national governments that influence public health policy any more, 
many other actors have entered the arena in different ways.
134
 It is likely that the continuing 
development for health cooperation move towards increased vertical public-private partnerships at 
both local and global level.
135
 At first glance this would seem great simply because the world get 
more actors trying to solve the problems with global health. There is however a potential problem 
with such a development; the international community does not have a good way of ensuring 
corporate compliance to international regulation. There is also the issue of potential hidden agendas 
in NGOs considering the low transparency due to the lack of obligation for them to reveal their true 
intentions. If they are profit driven organizations, they answer to no one but their stockholders. 
Regardless of how, it is evident that countries need to cooperate internationally. A nation aiming for 
development of course has to base its strategy on the specific needs and circumstances of that 
nation, but adherence to international cooperation with its rules and regulations, is at least as 
important if the country want to become a stable economic force in a globalized economy.
136
 
Finally, an insufficient economic growth is inescapably connected to a decrease in resources for 
health protection, which means that every program or measure to try to decrease health inequality, 
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has to take the creation of peace and a stable society into account in order to create an environment 




4.6 Global health and development  
Being healthy is a necessity to be able to participate in society. Being able to work, vote, and all 
other aspects of leading a normal life, all require a stable physical health as well as access to a safe 
and functioning health system. Without a healthy population a country cannot build a functioning 
legal and administrative infrastructure to manage a domestic government, let alone enter into 
cooperation with other states about global concerns. Hence, any serious development strategy must 
entail a forceful plan to improve global health. In the late 1990's, the WHO initiated the 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, which managed to show that ill health was a cause of 
poverty and that intervention to prevent and treat disease was cost-effective.
138
 Even though there 
are significant evidence to the role of liberalized trade and economic growth as a contributing factor 
in development, a pure market driven approach to development will not be able to see the nuances 
and potential contradictions of development.
139 
Improvement of social conditions, such as global 




4.6.1 Health as a global public good?  
In a globalized world, health policy issues are no longer confined within borders. With increased 
trade and movement, the health of a nation is affected by many factors with international origin that 
need trans-border cooperation. The most illustrative example is of course the matter of 
communicable diseases that almost never can be handled by a single nation.
141
 Since the interest of 
improving health is international, one could almost assume that global health is a global public 
good.  
4.6.1.1 What is a global public good?  
According to the UNDP, a public good is a good/benefit that, unlike private goods, cannot be 
restricted. It is available to all, and the benefit is not limited to the consumption of one individual; it 
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is non-excludable and non-rival.
142
 To be a global public good it also has to be universal in terms of 
countries, people and generations.
143
 Global health does not fall directly under this category, but it 
can provide effects that resemble a global public good. The prevention of certain communicable 
diseases has both individual and global benefits. Considering the cumulative economic effect on 
national/regional health in terms of loss of production and income that an unhealthy population 
causes, there are substantial potential gains in health improvement.
144
 An excellent example is the 
issue of HIV/Aids. This disease causes a considerable decrease in life expectancy and thereby 
decreases income of both the individual and the country.   
4.6.1.2 Public goods and the prisoner's dilemma   
Public goods generally suffer from a collective action problem.
145
 The community as a whole is 
better off if public goods are provided, but in order to avoid free riding and the prisoner's dilemma, 
collective action is required. The prisoner's dilemma can basically be defined as lack of 
communication in a group as well as lack of information about each participant's actions, combined 
with the lack of enforcement mechanisms. The political process necessary to ensure an international 
collective action is fundamental to securing a global public good. The problem of collective action 
becomes even more complex when it comes to a global issue. The absence of a global government 
makes global public goods hard to finance and enforce.  
4.6.2 Socioeconomic factors to health  
Inequalities in health that can be avoided exist both between and within countries and originate in 
the social and economic conditions people live in, which determine their so called social economic 
status, SES. This status also include levels of income and education and help assess what risk 
people have of being exposed to a certain disease as well as what kind of access to treatment they 
will have.
146
 Components of a population's SES are often more important contributors to their 
health status than medical care itself.
147
 The WHO defines social determinants of health as “the 
conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work and age, including the health system.”148 
WHO also conclude that it is primarily these determinants that are responsible for health inequities. 
In 2005 the WHO established CSDH with the purpose to provide advice on how to reduce these 
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inequities. In August the Commission launched a final report with three overall goals: (1) improve 
daily living conditions; (2) tackle inequitable distribution of power, money and resources; and (3) 
measure and understand the problem and assess the impact of action.149 The CSDH believes that 
positioning health equity as a key performance indicator in all social and economic policy making 
could potentially create significant reductions in health inequalities.150 It is statistically clear that 
poor social and economic circumstances throughout life affect the health of an individual; “further 
down the social ladder” life expectancy is lower and diseases are more common.151 Statistic 
findings also show that almost all diseases and causes of death show differences in SES.152 Where 
an individual is hierarchically positioned in society can have both a direct effect on the health of the 
individual, as well as an indirect effect through SES related differences in physical and social 
environment, health behaviors or personality. 
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5. Health as a human right  
The need to improve social determinants of health is since long highly recognized in the 
international community and there are strategies and battles fought on multiple fronts to try to find 
the best solution on how to improve the health of the globe. A significant part of this fight is the 
attempt to get health internationally recognized as a human right.  
5.1 Human rights 
Human rights are rights that all individuals are equally entitled to simply because they are 
human.
153
 International human rights law basically governs what the government can, cannot, and 
should do for its citizens.
154
 All human rights imposes three main obligation on the member states: 
(1) A duty to respect the rights – member states may not interfere with an individual enjoying its 
human rights; (2) A duty to protect the rights – this means that the member states have to prevent its 
citizens from other interference with the rights, for example from the private sector; and (3) a duty 
to fulfill the rights.
155
 It is not enough just to prevent from interfering in enjoyment of rights; 




5.2 UNDHR - international framework for human rights  
When the UN was created in 1945 after the Second World War, the UNC applied an obligation on 
all member states to respect human rights and dignity. In 1948 this aspirational statement was 
crystallized into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
157
 This declaration has been ratified by 
most nations in the world and even though it is not a legally binding treaty, it is the cornerstone of 
all human rights.
158
 The declaration did not have an immediate effect. After World War II, the main 
focus and allocation of resources for development was put into technology and scientific progress 
and there was a period of almost declining interest in human rights. Eventually the interest 
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resurfaced and the idea of turning UNDHR into a legal binding and enforceable treaty emerged. The 
political climate during the cold war caused polarized views on what human rights were, so when 
UN finalized its work it resulted in two different treaties: the ICCPR, and the ICESCR adopted in 
1966.  
5.2.1 ICCPR and ICESCR 
The ICCPR govern civil and political rights that are normally classified as 'negative rights' that 
provide protection from what the government may do to an individual
159
, while the ICESCR 
protects economic, social and cultural rights, normally called 'positive rights' that inflict duties for 
the state to provide services to their citizens.
160
 The ICCPR requires immediate guarantee from its 
member states, while the rights under ICESCR can be progressively realized.
161
 Due mainly to 
unequal resources among the member states, the UN uses the idea of progressive realization to 
allow member states to progress towards the goal according in its own pace without being in 
violation of international law immediately.
162
 Each covenant is governed by a committee that 
monitors its implementation. Unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR does not have a mandatory individual 
complaint mechanism to enforce the rights, but just recently an optional protocol for the ICESCR 
was opened, which allows individual complaints of member states' violations to the ICESCR.
163
  
Despite the division into two treaties, in international law, both sets of rights are considered equal 
and interdependent of each other.
164
 The UNDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR are jointly referred to as the 
International Bill of Human Rights.
165
 
5.3 Health as a human right under international regulation  
Promotion and protection of human rights is fundamentally linked to the promotion and protection 
of health.
166
 Art 25 of the UNDHR begins with the statement: “Everyone has the right to a standard 
of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, 
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the 
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event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control.”  This broad and unspecified human right is further defined in 
article 12 of the ICESCR: “1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” The 
phrasing 'highest attainable standard' leaves room for a reasonableness standard, which means that 
the member states shall try to level the playing field regarding factors that they can control.
167
 
Article 12 further states that this shall be done with the “maximum available resources to the 
highest attainable resources”. Recently the UN issued a resolution on “The right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” showing just how 
pressing the issue is.
168
  
5.3.1 How is the right to health defined? 
Despite this extensive legal framework, there has been a lot of debate if health really is a right and if 
so, how to define it. What obligations does it really impose on the member states? When the WHO 
was started in 1946 it defined health as a “state of complete physical, mental a social well-being, 
and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”169. Neither the 1948 UNDHR nor the 1966 
ICSECR adopted a clear definition of health. Nevertheless, a clear definition is important to clarify 
obligations, establish enforcement of the obligations and procedures to identify violations of 
them.
170




5.3.1.1 Comment 14 – the right to the highest attainable standard of health  
Issued by the UN in 2000, Comment 14 is probably the most authoritative statement on the meaning 
of the right to health.
172
 Section 1 of Comment 14 states the following definition: “Health is a 
fundamental human right indispensable for the exercise of other human rights. Every human being 
is entitled to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health conduce to living a life in 
dignity. The realization of the right can be pursued through numerous, complementary approaches... 
Moreover, the right to health includes certain components which are legally enforceable.” 
Comment 14 describes the four most important parts of the normative content of ICESCR as (1) 
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availability, (2) accessibility, (3) acceptability, and (4) quality.
173
 This essentially means that all 
basic conditions necessary for health shall be available and accessible to all individuals in the 
member states and that all health services are as well ethically and culturally appropriate as 
scientifically and medically appropriate.
174
 Comment 14 defines some core obligations in order to 
move up the bare minimum for progressive realization and provide guidelines on how to 
progressively realize these goals. It should be noted that for many developing countries, even the 
core obligations can be almost impossible for many developing countries. The perhaps most 
important accomplishment of Comment 14 is that it clarifies that 'the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health' is not confined to the right to health care, but on the contrary, that the 
right “embraces a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions in which people 
can lead a healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinants of health...”175 This support the 
notion that a true realization of equal global health will require that the world take action on the 
underlying social determinants of health.   
5.4 International protection of the right to health  
States have a natural responsibility for the health within their own borders but due to the 
increasingly global nature of health issues, states cooperate to achieve the best coordinated results. 
States generally cooperate by transferring knowledge and by building up a consensus on a global 
health issue that quite often result in an agreement or understanding of some sort.
176
 International 
cooperation on health protection has a long history. Already between the years of 1851-1909, ten 
different international meetings were held to deal with the epidemics of plague and cholera and 




5.4.1 The UN and the WHO  
The main agreements on the right to health have been negotiated under the UN umbrella. Current 
international cooperation in protection of health is primarily done through the UN agency WHO 
specifically designated to coordinate international health activities, although a significant number of 
UN organizations have missions that in some way concern the protection or development of global 
                                               
173 Page 29, Gostin  
174 Page 29, Gostin  
175 Comment 14, point 4.  
176 Page 657, Walt, Buse  





 All members make contributions to the work of the WHO based on the size of its 
population and wealth, but they all have equal voting rights before an understanding.
179
 The biggest 
problem with the WHO as an agency in protection of health is that the agreements that the WTO 
govern really does not have satisfactory enforcement mechanisms. 
5.4.2 Other international cooperation for health 
Due to overlapping mandates and poor coordination within the UN organizations, it is highly likely 
that the role of the UN in the international area will be diminished as the importance of horizontal 
cooperation increases.
180
 Other international actors that strive to protect the interest of global health, 
such as bilateral organizations, NGO's, representatives from the corporate sector and different 
institutions that help with providing financial mechanisms - such as the World Bank and the global 
fund to fight aids tuberculosis and malaria, are likely to play a greater part.
181
 Private companies are 
becoming more and more important through a stronger CSR culture. Considering that some 
powerful multinationals have an annual turnover way higher than the GDP of low-income countries, 
they could become very influential.
182
 
5.5 Problems with the right to health approach 
There are a number of challenges to the right to health approach. Health is by far universally 
recognized as a human right. The US, maybe the most influential nation in the world, signed the 
ICESCR in 1977 but has yet to ratify and thereby make it legally binding.
183
 Neither do health 
protecting agreements generally have a strong enforcement mechanism. Many question if health 
really can be considered a right if no efficient legal remedy exist. 
5.5.1 'Social clauses' as a way to ensure enforcement?  
As shown above there is some evidence that suggest that liberal economic trade will undermine 
public health by increasing social inequalities. A huge concern is that agreements on social 
obligations generally do not have the same enforcement mechanisms as trade agreements do. One 
suggestion on how to solve this problem is to include so called 'social clauses' into international 
trade agreements.
184
 These clauses would basically consist of already existing international 
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obligations, for example from UN multilateral declarations that are currently basically 
unenforceable due to the lack of an international government of any sort. By including these 
obligations as a 'social clause' into enforceable trade agreements, the global economy could promote 
both health as well as a more socially just world.
185
 Current international trade agreements often do 
contain provisions that take health into consideration and sometimes allow for exceptions in the 
liberalizing trade obligations if it is necessary to protect a domestic interest in health protection.
186
 
These provisions definitely need to be strengthened or clarified in order to realize a more 
sustainable globalization, but at the same time it is important to ensure that they are not used as a 
cover for trade protectionism. 
187
   
5.5.2 Health as an interpretive principle?  
An alternative to the 'right to health approach' is to see protection of health as a guiding principle 
for all interpretation of international agreements. Some authors claim that the WTO praxis has 
developed exactly this way.
188
 Even though this principle is nowhere to be found expressively 
within WTO documents, many AB decisions have had this approach towards interpreting national 
health regulations and their compliance with WTO agreements.
189
 Reports from the AB is 
technically not binding to anyone but the parties of the dispute, but naturally WTO members rely on 
reasoning from previous reports when they are parties to a settlement themselves. The DSU also 
require the AB to promote “security and predictability” in its dispute settlement.190 This means that 
any interpretation in an adopted report de facto becomes a part of the acquis of the WTO system 
and thereby has some value as precedent and that a specific legal issue will most likely be resolved 
the same way in a later case.
191
 Since precedents are given this much value, health could definitely 
become a solidified interpretive principle in any WTO disputes.  
6 The WTO and global health  
The WTO has been seen by many as a threat to global health due to a perception that the purpose 
and regulation of the WTO conflicts with national efforts to protect the lives and health of their 
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 Opponents to globalization see corporate globalization as the primary cause 
to income inequality around the world and believe that the WTO is the main source to corporate 
globalization.
193
 Some even argue that the WTO promotes the interests of multinationals and rich 
countries over the poor, and that the language of the treaties and the dispute settlement mechanism 
completely neglect the issues of health and human welfare.
194 
At the same time other economic 
theories suggest that trade liberalization and economic development have a positive impact on the 
social determinants of health that are necessary in order to realize the right to health. Inequality and 
income disparity could very well be cause by different rates of growth in different nations. Since 
one of the benefits of trade is increased growth, the international trade agreements under the WTO 
can actually be seen as a necessary, yet insufficient, condition for global equality.
195  
Increased 
awareness of the connections between global health and international trade, combined with the 
potential ramifications of the HIV/Aids epidemic, has placed health as a more and more central 
trade issue. The WTO has recently both taken and been given an increased role in the health debate.  
Changes to trade agreements, as well as changes to the interpretation of the agreements, have 
followed this debate.  
6.1 Protection for health within the WTO system  
The current round of negotiations in the WTO system, the Doha round, launched in 2001 with the 
intention of being the 'Development round' in order to support developing countries to reach their 
development potential.
196
 This clearly shows a more comprehensive understanding of the 
connections between trade and social development. However, the WTO system does not recognize 
health as a human right the way the UN system does.
197
 In fact the ministerial Conference at Doha 
actually expressly declined to recognize such a right after a group of developing countries suggested 
an inclusion of a reference to the right to health “as affirmed in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” in a proposal for the Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS 
agreement and public health.
198
 The WTO does not have the authority to form its own health 
policies, but there are indications towards a WTO practice of recognizing health as a soft, 
unenforceable right by making it state practice to treat protection of social and economic rights as a 
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directive and interpretive principle when complying with the WTO obligations.
199
  
6.2 Provisions in the WTO agreements in protection of health  
At the first glance, the WTO agreements are extremely vague on how they try to balance health 
protection against other trade issues. Neither the Marrakesh Agreement nor any of the major 
agreements under the WTO umbrella contain provision stating that protection of health is a purpose 
or even an interpretive principle of the agreements. The GATT, GATS and SPS Agreements do 




6.2.1 GATT art XX b and subsequent cases 
Art XX b is the general safety clause of the GATT agreement and has been the origin to many DSU 
disputes. It allows the WTO parties to take trade restricting measures, or other provisions that may 
be prohibited by the GATT agreement, as long as they are “necessary to protect human... life or 
health.”201 If a country takes such a measure that another contracting party considers unnecessary, 
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the appropriate mean to settle the issue. If a panel is 
commissioned, it shall make an 'objective assessment' of facts and law to determine the necessity of 
the health protective measures taken.
202
 This means that the decision to restrict trade to protect 
health needs to be based on some scientific evidence and supported by research data of a health risk 
in order to be justified, but it is generally not required that the decision is based on a majority 
scientific opinion.
203
 A very famous case involving interpretation of GATT, art XX b, is the EC – 
Asbestos case where the AB concluded that “WTO members have a right to determine the level of 
protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situation.”204 This case is significant 
because it highlights the importance of health as a multilateral goal and its supremacy compared to 
other social goals. The more important end, the easier the WTO system can accept measures taken 
to protect this end.
205 
 In another WTO dispute, the case of EC-Hormones, the AB came to the 
conclusion that health was no less vital in the context of SPS and food safety than in the trade 
related GATT context. Art 5 of the SPS requires a risk assessment that the EC-Hormones ruling 
specify; a contracting party has to reach a threshold level of risk in order to justify any trade-
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 The risk assessment does not have to be based on 'mainstream' scientific 
opinion, but some supporting research data is necessary.
207
 It also has to be a rational relationship 
between the risk assessment and the protective measure taken.
208
  
6.3 TRIPS – the biggest conflict between the WTO system and global 
health protection  
Despite the provisions in the WTO agreements in protection of health, there is one part of the WTO 
system that is highly questioned for its compliance with international protection of global health: 
the TRIPS agreement. TRIPS is one of the three main agreements and was added to the WTO 
system with the end of the Uruguay round. The main purpose of TRIPS is to oblige all WTO 
members to offer all other members a minimum standard of protection for intellectual property.
209
 
When TRIPS was included into the WTO package, it was the first time IP rules were integrated into 
the multilateral trading system.
210
 It was an attempt to narrow the gap between IPR protections over 
the world by establishing common international rules.
211
 TRIPS was controversial when it was 
created, and it continues to divide its evaluators. What is it about this agreement that can make 
some people call it “the greatest trade agreement in history” while others see it as a “TRAP” to 
both developed and developing countries?
212 
For example some believe that when the agreement 
was drafted, far more attention was paid to satisfy the pharmaceutical and entertainment industry 
than to create an IP regime that was beneficial to public health, education, food security and the 
interests of developing countries.
213
 Since medications usually contain a number of protected IPRs, 
the greatest conflict between the WTO and health protection is generally trade with medications that 
have the potential to save lives. 
6.3.1 Purpose and coverage of TRIPS 
The main purpose of TRIPS is to oblige all WTO members to offer a minimum standard of 
protection for intellectual property.
214
 The agreement covers the three most economically important 
areas of IP (patent, copyright and trademarks) as well as some additional specific IPRs.
215  
The 
                                               
206 EC-Hormones, AB Report 1998, paragraph 186  
207 EC-Hormones, AB Report 1998, paragraph 194 
208 EC-Hormones, AB Report 1998, paragraph 193 
209 Page 39, Understanding the WTO 
210 Page 39, Understanding the WTO 
211 Page 39, Understanding the WTO 
212 Page 1, El Said 
213 Page 12, Dutfield, Suthersanen  
214 Page 39, Understanding the WTO 
215 Page 597, Guzman, Pauwelyn 
 45 
 
agreement both incorporates the IP conventions that were in action when TRIPS was entered into as 
well as adds some new substantive obligations - giving it a much broader scope than previous 
agreement in this field.
216
 The agreement permits the members to implement a more extensive 
protection for IPRs than TRIPS requires, and the freedom to decide the most appropriate way to 
effectuate the provisions.
217
 The agreement does however entail some rules that are intended to 
assure that all member give effective domestic enforcement to its provisions and any disputes 
between the members regarding the provisions are to be settled under the WTO system, governed 
by the DSU.
218 
According to the WTO, the underlying philosophy behind TRIPS is to attempt to 
“strike a balance between long term social objective of providing incentives for future inventions 
and creation and the short term objective of allowing people to use existing inventions and 
creations.”219 An important principle throughout TRIPS is that any protection of IP should 
contribute to innovation and transfer of technology.
220
 Starting with the GATT and its trade policies, 
TRIPS is a revolutionary example of how the WTO switched focus in policy to a more positive 
regulation of as well substantive provisions, as well as legal procedures.
221
 Its belonging in the 
WTO structure has been severely questioned, much due to a sometimes very limited relationship to 
trade.
222
 In fact, due to the exclusivity of IPRs, they can be seen as a per se restriction to trade.
223
 
Considering this, what reasons could there have been to include protection of IP into a multilateral 
trade organization that advocates minimized barriers to trade?   
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PART III  
7 IP protection rationale  
Intellectual property can, simply put, be explained as “legal rights which result from intellectual 
activity in the industrial, scientific, literary and artistic fields”224 or as “creations of the mind” such 
as inventions, literature, art work and design.
225
 Protection of IP generally consists of an exclusive 
but limited statutory right for the creator or producer of the intellectual property, to control the use 
the property.
226
 The economically most important IPRs are patents, copyrights and trademarks and 




7.1 The exclusivity of IPRs 
The justifications to the exclusive nature of IPRs can be divided into three categories.
228
   
(1) Incentive and motivation; (2) Fairness; (3) Economic benefit. Being given an IPR can be seen as 
an incentive given to inventors in order to encourage them to create more inventions. Incentive is 
only a good justification for exclusive IPRs assuming that a high quantity of inventions is beneficial 
to society. The societal benefit is normally argued with the fact that an applied and commercialized 
invention could contribute to economic and social development.
229
 In order to be innovative and 
create opportunities through new technologies, companies have to invest quite a lot of money into 
R&D. Exclusive IPRs assure control over the economic use of the invention. If companies do not 
expect a return on their investments, they are not likely to do the R&D necessary for the creation of 
new inventions. It could also be argued that justice requires IPRs to be exclusive and that it would 
not be fair or morally right if the creator or owner of a certain IP would not be able to benefit from 
it without protection from attempts to violate it and benefit themselves. Finally, IPRs have the 
exclusive feature with the economic argument that it prevents free riding, optimize resource 
allocation and avoid market failure. This justification is built on the assumption that knowledge is a 
public good. Free riding is a big problem in countries with weak IPRs because imitators can then 
quickly and cheaply copy products based on the inventions of others and sell them domestically or 
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in another country with weak IPRs. 
7.2 The connection between IP and trade  
It is obvious that the IPRs have become significantly more important in commercial settings. With 
globalization and trade liberalization, markets become more receptive to competition. When 
companies feel the pressure to be competitive in order to survive, they have to be innovative and 
creative to be original and beat the competition.
230 
The value of new high technology products 
increase when more innovation, research and development are put into them, which means that 
ideas and knowledge are becoming increasingly important factors to trade.
231
  
7.2.1 IPR protection in importing countries   
Since it can generally be assumed that a company will only invest a lot in R&D for new innovations 
if they are protected by strong IPRs, the protection of IPRs in other countries is probably a very 
important factor when they decide if and where to they will export products resulting from that 
research. If other countries than the country where the producing company is located also have 
strong IPRs, it could encourage the company to export its products to that country because it does 
not fear free riding. Hence, strong international IPRs could increase the flow of products between 
nations and thereby have a positive impact on international trade. At the same time, a company that 
is given domestic exclusive IPRs for their products are more likely to try to prevent the import of 
any products that might be a violation on their domestic rights. Instead of increasing the flow of 
trade, this could create barriers and thereby have a negative impact on international trade. IPRs have 
both the potential to increase innovation, as well as the tendency to increase prices.   
7.3 Interests of the industrialized world to regulate IPR protection 
The increased role of IP in commercial trade brought substantial changes to the IP regulation in 
developed countries since the 1960's and 1970's.
232. 
It has led to (1) a widening of the subject matter 
that can be protected; (2) creation of new rights, and a; (3) progressive standardization of IPRs.
233
 
The extent of IP protection naturally varies around the world, so when IP protected products, as well 
as the IPRs themselves, became increasingly important to trade, the issue of IPRs eventually made 
its way onto the international trade negotiations tables. Important and influential multinationals and 
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huge enterprises in industrialized countries believed that weak IPRs in developing countries caused 
them a lot of financial losses through imitations and counterfeiting and managed to pressure their 
governments to push the issue of global standardization of IPRs.
234
 Especially the US and the EU 
governments started to pursue an international agenda to harmonize the IPR protection levels 
internationally despite a very reluctant and resisting attitude from the developing world.
235
  
7.3.1 Development of industrial pressure for international IPRs 
One of the main reasons to why the developed world advocated to include IPRs under a multilateral 
forum is that they were pushed by domestic interest groups.
236
 One interest group that had major 
impact is the US pharmaceutical industry. Already in 1985 the US pharmaceutical industry 
campaigned to persuade developing countries to adopt patent laws formed in the same way as US 
patent laws.
237
 They strategy was twofold: both to persuade the US policy makers to force the 
policy makers of the developing world to adopt the US type of patent rules, and to convince the 
governments of developing countries about the advantages of such a patent system.
238
 In fact, many 
former governmental officials went to work for the US trade association for the pharmaceutical 
industry and allowed the association to become a very prominent and aggressive lobbyist group in 
Washington that even managed to acquire seats on important advisory boards that shape 
government policy.
239
 Lobbyists also funded academic studies to prove the advantages of strict 
patent protection, frequently appeared before Congressional committees about the need to secure 
greater patent protection abroad and managed to frame other countries protection for IPRs as being 
an issue that concerned US trade policy.
240
 Despite the fact that the pharmaceutical industry 
received harsh critique for inflating domestic prices, the industry was very successful in making its 




7.3.2 Governmental actions as a result of industrial pressure 
The changes in international trade policy that the industry managed to bring about resulted in 
unilateral, regional and multilateral action from the US government. Unilaterally, the USTR put 
high pressure on individual developing countries to change their policies into strict patent laws 
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similar to the US system; regionally IP protection became an important part of the NAFTA 
agreement and the US proclaimed that it would be included into all regional trade agreements that 
the US would be a party to; and finally and most importantly to this context; multilaterally the US 
government started to insist that IP protection should be included into the Uruguay round of 
multilateral trade negotiations.
242 
By the time the GATT contracting parties met in Punta del Esta, 
Uruguay to launch a new round of trade negotiations, US corporations and governments had 
managed to forge a broad, cross-sector alliance and developed a coordinated strategy to advocate a 
standardization of international IP protection.
243
  
7.4 Why negotiations in the trade context? 
In order to be able to analyze the impact and consequences of the TRIPS agreement, it is important 
to understand why the developed world wanted to push the issue of IPR protection on the 
multilateral arena in general and in the context of trade negotiations in particular.  
7.4.1 Previous unilateral attempts for IPR protection  
Unilaterally the US has a long tradition of trying to impose its own IP protections onto other 
countries. Authorized by Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the USTR office started in the mid 
1980's to create so called 'watch lists' with countries that did not fulfill their requirements for 
protection of US IPRs.
244
 Countries that made the list were informed that if their IP laws were not 
reformed into providing more protection, the US would impose trade tariffs on any of their 
exporting goods going into the US.
245
 Many countries were listed but the main targets were the 
developing countries that had been able to start up domestic pharmaceutical industries, such as 
India, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, and Thailand, whose competition could become a threat to US 
manufacturers. Especially Brazil and India were starting to become important forces when it came 
to organizing the developing countries for multilateral trade negotiations.
246
 The threat, or maybe 
even realization, of trade sanctions led to a change in policy in both Thailand and Taiwan. When it 
came to Brazil, the US had to realize the threat and imposed high tariffs on certain Brazilian 
imports; even then the Brazil only changed their IP laws marginally and it did so under wild and 
loud objections.
247
 India and Argentina were able to essentially resist the US pressure.   
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7.4.2 Transfer into the multilateral arena  
It is not hard to comprehend why IP protection became a multilateral issue. Even though the US 
unilateral enforcement approaches through Section 301 had proven to be successful and provided 
the US an opportunity to set an example to the rest of the world by attacking selected foreign 
pharmaceutical regimes, it was still a slow and inefficient process to target countries one by one.
248
 
It became more and more obvious that a more cohesive approach was necessary to create a 
harmonized and standardized protection of IP. However, why the developed world chose 
international trade negotiations under the GATT as the forum for the multilateral negotiations about 
IP protection is a slightly more complex issue.  
7.4.3 WIPO or GATT?  
IP was not an internationally unregulated issue before the TRIPS agreement emerged. The perhaps 
most commercially important agreements were, and still are, the Paris Convention on patents, and 
the Berne Convention on copyrights. Both are governed by WIPO, the specialized UN agent for IP 
established in 1967 and entered into force in 1974.
249
 WIPO administers 24 multilateral agreements 
and would have been a more obvious choice of international cooperation to govern a negotiation of 
an international agreement about IPR protection. WIPO did however have a big flaw according to 
the industrialized countries; it did not offer a strong enough enforcement mechanism.
250
 Even the 
original GATT agreement had an enforcement mechanism and it seemed likely that the WTO 
system would entail an even stronger. The fact that WIPO did not offer an enforcement mechanism 
made regulation of IPR protection under the GATT/WTO instead of WIPO very important also to 
US multinational pharmaceuticals and entertainment or software industries.
251 
Unlike WIPO, the 
WTO system also offered the opportunity to gather all main IPRs in one single agreement which no 
one could opt out from if they wanted to become members in the WTO.
252
  This meant that an 
international agreement under the WTO would globalize high standards of IPR's much faster than 
the WIPO administered conventions could. 
8 The Uruguay round and IPRs – the great bargain  
In September 1986, the round of multilateral trade negotiations that would turn out to be the most 
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groundbreaking ever, was launched with the Ministerial Conference in Punta del Este, Uruguay.
253
 
It was intended to have started earlier but the parties had difficulties in agreeing on what to include 
into the negotiation agenda. The agenda that was finally accepted basically covered all thinkable 
trade policy issues but one of the new areas to be negotiated that really stood out from the others 
was of course the regulation of IPRs.
254
 
8.1 Continuation of the forum question  
The inclusion of IPR standards into the negotiation about the GATT framework was far from 
obvious. Developing countries were originally a lot more in favor of continuing to use WIPO as the 
main agency for IPR regulation because it was more sympathetic to their demand and because they 
believed that they would be able to have a greater influence there.
255
 Many developed countries did 
however feel that it was a necessity to combine IP and trade. Japan and the US tried to use the 
upcoming Ministerial Conference in Punta del Este to place this issue on the agenda by submitting 
proposals to the Preparatory Committee that negotiations should cover all IPRs and their 
enforcement.
256
 This was quickly followed by proposals from Brazil and Argentina opposing the 
inclusion of IPRs into a new round of negotiations, but the issue was already on the table.
257
 The 
debate if GATT negotiations really were the best forum for regulation of IPRs continued for a long 
time into the Uruguay round. Even as late into the negotiation round as 1990, Chile suggested that 
any proposals of IP regulation that came up during the GATT negotiation rounds should be directed 
to WIPO.
258
 After the developed world initiated intense pressure, promised trade concessions in 
other areas, and assured that unilateral and bilateral pressure would seize, developing countries 
finally began to give into an incorporation of IPR protection into the multilateral trade system.
259
  
8.2 Scope of the agreement  
The original purpose of an agreement on IPRs was to prevent the trade in 'counterfeit goods'.
260
 The 
negotiations did however result in a lot broader and more comprehensive agreement with common 
international trade rules for IPRs that among other things established a minimum level of protection 
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and thereby narrowed the gaps in global IPR protection.
261
 How was this possible?  
8.2.1 Developed world v developing world? 
As negotiations proceeded it became obvious that many countries were set on an agreement for IPR 
protection that was a lot more comprehensive than originally intended.
262
 By 1988 many developing 
countries showed great concern of a too comprehensive agreement on IPR protection because of a 
fear that such an agreement could seriously damage their access to technology transfer, and increase 
the costs of crucial agriculture and pharmaceutical products.
263
 In 1989 came the first suggestion to, 
by reference, include any agreement on IP that the negotiations might result in, into GATT. Almost 
immediately India tried to prevent this by stating that GATT rules should only apply in cases of 
trade distortion and requested that more favorable treatment for developing countries.
264
 That year 
the EU and the US both delivered very detailed drafts for an IPR agreement, which basically 
became the basis for the final TRIPS agreement.
265
   
8.2.2 Drafting the agreement  
There were basically two approaches to how the formation of an agreement should be done. The 
first one was built on the proposals from the EU and the US and entailed a single agreement that 
would cover acquisition and enforcement of all IPRs, a long with a reference making all 
GATT/upcoming WTO provisions applicable.
266
 The other approach represented the position of the 
developing countries that opposed a single agreement and instead suggested that the provisions 
should be separated into two different agreements, one for trade in counterfeit and one on 
“availability, scope and use of IPRs”.267 As the negotiations during the Uruguay round preceded the 
role and purpose of an IPR agreement evolved, so did the positions of the developing world. By 
1989, the ambivalence and hostility from early days of negotiations started to evaporate and the 
developing countries became less resistant to the idea of one agreement.
268
   
8.2.3 The great bargain  
The broad trade negotiation agenda of the Uruguay round opened up opportunities for linkage-
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 This means that in the context of GATT, the industrialized countries were able 
to offer the skeptic developing world concessions, in for example textiles and agriculture, in 
exchange for their acceptance of internationally strong IPRs, which very likely helped pave the way 
for the attitude change.
270
 The change in attitude from the developing countries basically has two 
possible explanations: (1) either they were willing to accept TRIPS as a part of the WTO package 
because they believed that the other parts of the WTO would provide benefits that would outweigh 
any potential economic or social costs, that TRIPS might cause; or (2) they found both TRIPS and 
the WTO package as a whole unsatisfactory, but could not really see an alternative but to agree to it 
due to the temptation of market access in developed countries combined with the threat of higher 
trade barriers and sanctions if they did not agree to it.
271
 Since the final results of the negotiations 
was a single agreement regulating all provisions concerning IPRs as well as a reference to all GATT 
provisions, it seems fair to say that the interests of the industrialized countries came were the ones 
that were protected the most.  
8.3 Compliance exemptions  
The negotiating parties did realize that it would be difficult for anyone to assure immediate 
compliance to the TRIPS agreement, and that developing countries would face even higher 
difficulties. Because of this developed countries were given a grace period of one year to adapt their 
domestic regulation to the provisions of TRIPS after it took effect in January of 1995, developing 
countries were given a transition period of five years and LDCs a period of eleven years, which 
later was extended by 10 additional years for pharmaceutical patents, thereby giving them until 
2016 to fully comply.
272
  
9 Important regulation in TRIPS  
For the purpose of this thesis there are three main areas of importance of the TRIPS regulation: (1) 
obligations and principles that explain what minimum protection means for the different types of 
IPRS; (2) provisions to assure effective enforcement; and (3) exceptions to the obligations and other 
considerations that may be taken into account.  
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9.1 Obligations to protect 
TRIPS for example defines what kind of IPRs that the member states are obliged to protect, what 
criteria that should be fulfilled in order to gain protection, for how long protection has to be offered, 
and how far the protection reaches. Since patent rights is the IPR of highest interest for this thesis, 
only the TRIPS obligations for this kind of IPR will be described in short. Patent rights have to be 
offered to protect both products and processes in a non-discriminatory way as long as the product or 
process is a novelty, an invention, and is useful/has industrial applicability.
273
 The protection has to 
last a minimum of 20 years.
274
  
9.2 Enforcement  
How members need to enforce IPRs is the most emphasized part of TRIPS. The agreement requires 
that all member states have procedures available that permit effective action against any act of 
infringement into a protected IPR.
275
 Both civil and criminal procedures need to be provided.
276
 All 
procedures in case of a conflict regarding an IPR must be fair and equitable and cannot be 
unnecessarily complicated, costly or time consuming.
277
 Judicial authorities in the member states 
must have the power to provide the different remedies to anyone whose right has been violated. 
Infringers can for example be required to pay damages that compensate the right holder for any 
injuries suffered due to the infringement.
278
  
9.3 Exceptions and other considerations 
TRIPS offer its member governments some alternatives when forming their own domestic IP 
regulation. In some cases they have the right to refuse protection of an IP, in other they may allow 
limited exceptions to the exclusiveness of an IPR and sometimes they may even ignore the 
exclusiveness altogether and permit a so called compulsory license to an IPR. Art 31 of TRIPS is 
basically a reminder to the contracting parties that they may adopt measures necessary to protect 
public health and nutrition, and promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their 
socio-economic and technological development, as long as such measures are consistent with the 
provisions of the agreement.
279
 It is in no way mandatory for the members to take measures like 
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this, but the provision highlights the socioeconomic welfare implications that IPRs can have.
280
  
9.3.1 Protection refusal  
The IPR that may cause the most trouble for protection of public health is the patent right. As an 
attempt to soften these effects, TRIPS allow contracting parties to refuse applicants a patent right 
for three reasons that relate to public health. (1) if it is necessary to prevent commercial exploitation 
of an invention in order to properly protect human, animal or plant life
281
; (2) if the patent 
application concerns a method of treatment of humans or animals
282
; and (3) certain plant and 
animal inventions in general.
283
  
9.3.2 Limited exceptions – art 30  
TRIPS also allow the members to provide limited exceptions to patents rights as long as the 
exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with normal exploitation of the patent or prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the patent holder.
284
 Under this provision members may give so called 
'research exception' that allow researchers to use patented inventions for research intended to 
understand the invention more fully.
285
 This article also provide for what is generally called the 
Bolar provision or regulatory exception that refer to governmental permission to manufacturers of 
generic alternatives to use a patented invention. For example this can be used to obtain marketing 
approval for their own product based on the permission given to the patent holder and to be able to 
develop a generic alternative before the patent right expires so that the generic version can be 
released onto the market as soon as the patent protection has expired.
286
 
9.3.3 Compulsory license – art 31  
TRIPS are 31 does not use the term compulsory license, instead it calls the phenomena “other use 
without authorization of the right holder”, but the two descriptions are basically interchangeable. 
TRIPS does not specifically list what reasons contracting parties may have that could justify a 
compulsory license, but it does provide some non-exhaustive examples such as national 
emergencies, circumstances of extreme urgency and anti-competitive practices.
287
 Issuance of a 
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compulsory license has to be made on a case by case basis and the intended user normally has to 
have tried to first obtain a voluntary license from the right holder, but this requirement can be 
waived in case of a national emergency, situations or extreme urgency or cases of public and non-
commercial use.
288 
In any case, the right holder has to be paid adequate remuneration for the 
unauthorized use of the IPR, which should consider the economic value of the authorization.
289
  
9.4 Parallel importing  
Another feature that can have significant impact on the exclusiveness of a right holder is the fact 
that TRIPS does not forbid members to adopt any laws on IP that allows parallel import that leads 
to an exhaustion of rights.
290 
 This means that members are allowed to have IP laws that permit 
importation of IP protected goods that were legally placed on the market in a foreign country, for 
example medicines that are cheaper in another country than in their own, and thereby undercutting 
the price of the same patented drug on the domestic market.
291
   
10. The potential conflict between IPR protection and 
development of global health 
A 2002 report from CIPR
292
 expressed serious doubt that current international IP regulation could 
be in the interest of the poor and makes a strong argument that the „one-size fits all‟ approach to 
regulation is not suitable when the required levels of protection are as high as today, with the 
potential of becoming even higher.
293
 CIPR argue that since both scientific and technological 
capacities vary along with social and economic structures of nations, the optimal IP protection 
should also vary between nations.
294
 Considering this, a multilateral harmonization of IPR‟s could 
be harmful to global health development.  
10.1 Pharmaceutical patents 
The most infected debate about IP protection and its potential inhibition for global health lies in 
pharmaceutical patents. An illuminating example of this conflict can be found in the millions of 
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people who die or suffer from diseases where medication actually exist that could help or even cure 
their conditions, but the people suffering for some reason do not have access to them.
295
 The most 
obvious explanation as to why people do not have access to these medications is lack of resources 
or simply put – poverty. Individuals in developing countries lack the finances necessary to pay for 
the medicine that they need and their governments generally lack the resources to build up the 
infrastructure that is needed to manufacture and distribute the medicines. An obvious approach to 
the reach improvement to this global health problem would be to try to keep prices on medication to 
a minimum; this is where the conflict with IP protection begins.  
10.1.1 Patent protection and price escalation 
Patents and other IPRs are meant to stimulate investment in R&D as well as promote a widespread 
commercialization of new technologies that could be useful to society.
296
 The patent right assures 
return on the R&D investment by providing the innovator with a temporary market exclusivity.
297
 
Since pharmaceuticals have very high R&D costs relative to all other production costs, the patent 
right gains even higher importance, because if drug manufacturers are not provided with a period of 
limited competition, the possibility of regaining their investments diminish and they do not have an 
equally strong incentive to develop new medications. However, due to the restriction in 
competition, patent protection is very likely to cause higher prices on pharmaceutical products than 
if they were subject to free competition on the market.
298
 Exactly how much a patent protection 
impacts the price of a pharmaceutical product is hard to say, it is not as easy as to say that 
pharmaceuticals are always more expensive with a patent right and cheaper without, but if the 
patent restrict competition, it will probably raise the prices.
299
 There are several documented 
situations where excessive pricing due to patent protection have been the cause to why a patient has 
not been able to access life-saving drugs.
300
 At the same time is has been argued that patent 
protection does not have a retroactive effect and thereby cannot affect the prices on products that 
already are available on the market, and that pharmaceuticals generally exist in a regulatory 
environment that determines prices, so that stricter patent protection therefore cannot cause higher 
drug prices.
301
 Since one way to improve global health is to increase access and lower prices, the 
big conflict between global health and IPR protection comes down the interest of new innovation, 
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versus the interest to avoid cost escalation.
302
  
10.1.2 Higher prices than R&D costs justify? 
The pharmaceutical industry normally defends itself against any critique concerning high prices 
with a reference to their high R&D costs. It is however important to remember that a significant 
part of the R&D funding come from governmental sources.
303
 Most new scientific discoveries are 
made by public institutes, such as universities, who then license the rights to private companies for 
development and exploitation.
304
 Additionally, pharmaceutical companies often include a number of 
aspects into their calculated R&D costs that might inflate the numbers significantly, such as running 
costs, overheads, spill-over‟s and inefficiency.305 Moreover, the pharmaceutical industry has a long 
standing reputation of being among the most profitable industry sectors in the world.
306
 All of 
which could be argued against their statement that their high prices are justified.  
10.1.3 Poor patent quality  
The number of patents that are issued for genuinely new inventions is quite low; most patent 
applications are minor developments where the 'innovation' relies on previous innovations and 
generally available techniques.
307
 This leads to poor patent quality and a significant increase in 
patent coverage, which creates barriers for competitors that the 'new' technique might not really 
justify.
308
 Some even argue that large companies have learned how to exploit soft patent standards 
and less than thorough patent application examinations in order to gain as many patents as possible 
and thereby delay potential generic competition.
309 
This problem deserves some special attention in 
developing countries that do not have well developed competition laws to fight this type of 
behavior. Especially since it is quite common that the agency or authority responsible for granting 
patents in many developing countries do not really perform a substantive examination before a 
patent is granted, making the application more of a registration.
310
 Combined with international 
regulation that require tough enforcement of patent rights, this unsophisticated way of granting 
patents causes a risk of asymmetry in the system, where it is easy to be granted a patent right but 
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very hard to challenge it.
311
 Considering this, developing countries could partly fight the poor 
access to medication through a re-evaluation and development of the process of patent examination, 
and approval of an application.
312
  
10.1.4 Research priorities  
Pharmaceutical companies could also be criticized for their research priorities; not enough attention 
is aimed at life-saving drugs with low profit incentives. The general response from the 
pharmaceutical industry to this critique is that the patent-protected monopoly pricing is necessary to 
promote research on breakthrough drugs of value to all.
313
 There is however overwhelming 
evidence that there generally is not enough focus on the most needed medication, even despite the 
patent incentive. Very little resources are spent on research for drugs that treat diseases that affect 
the poor in disproportional ways.
314
 Development of medicines for tropical diseases basically stand 
still and only receive a fraction of funding compared to research for treatment of lifestyle diseases 
such as obesity and impotence.
315
 It is how ever hard to say if patents are the cause of this 
development. With a free market world order the companies will pursuit profit for their shareholder 
over global health and research is bound to focus on areas where there is money to be made.
316
 One 
could argue that if patent rights were created to serve the public interest, more should be done to 




10.2 IPRs only a public good in industrialized countries?  
Some argue that patent protection can be a public good, but only for industrialized nations and huge 
multinationals.
318 
It is highly questioned if IPRs really create an incentive for pharmaceutical 
industries to develop the drugs that the developing world really needs since it is only the cheaper 
drugs that have any chance of being used on a scale large enough to make a profit.
319
 It is however 
possible that the mere development of new drugs can lead to enhanced welfare through increase in 
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 In order to improve access to drugs in poor countries, it is probably not 
enough to rely on merely the pharmaceutical companies and the R&D incentive that patent rights 
provide. The industry itself is of course a necessary prerequisite for drug development, but if the 
goal is development of cheap drugs in order to fight global health problems, it is necessary to invest 
money in public health programs, for example through international aid and different collaborations 
between the private and public sector with focus on CSR.
321
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11 The impact of TRIPS on the developing world  
Aware of the inherent conflict between protection of IPRs and the promotion of global health, it  is 
time to analyze what impact the most comprehensive international agreement on IPRs has had on 
global health in general and in the developing world in particular. Does the classic IP rationale work 
in developing countries? Does stronger protection for IPR inhibit development and public health, or 
are IPRs a necessary component to innovation stimuli and thereby increased economic development 
and general wealth? Representatives from developing countries keep expressing concern that 
TRIPS causes increased prices of medical technologies, pharmaceuticals and educational materials 
in developing countries and blocks the highly essential transfer of technology.
322
  
11.1 A weaker voice in international IP regulation?  
Some argue that developing countries had more influence in multilateral cooperation on IPRs 
before TRIPS and its minimum standards.
323
 Developing countries used to have the possibility to 
opt out or make reservations to international IP regulation if they believed that the agreement would 
hurt their special needs as a developing country, but when TRIPS included IP regulations into the 
WTO system and the 'take it or leave it' approach of the single undertaking, this possibility 
disappeared.
324
 Before TRIPS, developing countries only had to decide if they wanted to participate 
in multilateral IP regulation, but after TRIPS the strategy has to be to find the most efficient and 
appropriate way to participate in order to defend their interests.
325
  
11.2 Patent rights and pharmaceuticals 
On the surface it appears that TRIPS require the member states to offer equal patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products and other technological products. However, some argue that 
pharmaceutical products are not 'ordinary consumer products' due to their life saving potential.
326
 
Patients that want to be cured have to buy the drugs, patent protected or not. Therefore, the major 
public policy issue regarding TRIPS is developing countries‟ right to develop generic, low-price 
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pharmaceuticals when necessary to prevent a public health crisis. It is obvious that patent right was 
the IPR where industrialized and developing countries were the most divided prior to TRIPS.
327
 
Critics generally opposed patents for pharmaceutical products more than the pharmaceutical 
process, for example countries such as India that previously only provided patent protection for 
pharmaceutical processes, claim that that strong patent system for products establishes a monopoly 




11.2.1 TRIPS and price escalation 
The available economic evidence on what impact patent rights have had on pharmaceutical prices is 
highly polarized, but the risk of higher prices is daunting.
329 
For example, an Argentinean study 
from 2000 indicated that prices would increase with 270% if product patents were to be 
introduced.
330 
 Developing countries are already disadvantaged. Even though the prices of a drug 
may be nominally cheaper in a developing country compared to a developed country, the income 
rate and purchasing power in a developing country is generally much lower, which makes the actual 
cost for the domestic population is much higher in developing countries compared to the developed 
world.
331
 Furthermore, one should take into consideration that a consumer usually does not even 
have the possibility to decide what pharmaceutical product to buy; the decision lies rather with the 
physician that prescribes the drug than with the consumer.
332
  
11.3 Corporate environment – lack of generic competition   
Once a patent right expires, generic competitors normally enter the market in numbers to raise the 
competition. In developed countries, such as the US, generic producers generally enter the market 
for a certain drug with much lower prices than the existing brand competitors and the prices 
normally drop even further when more and more generic competitors enter the market.
333
 TRIPS is 
criticized for making it more difficult for generic drug manufacturers to compete with the patent 
protected drugs. Once a pharmaceutical company is granted a patent in a poor developing country, 
which often lack an adequate patent process, TRIPS provides the pharmaceutical company with the 
patent protection and strong enforcement mechanisms that generics have a really hard time to 
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 This could cause a situation where big multinational pharmaceutical companies 
that control strong and important IPRs, eventually build up the strength to overpower minor 
countries. Since companies are not parties to the WTO system they cannot be in breach of the 
agreements and thereby not held accountable under the dispute settlement system. So far the WTO 
system does not offer a solution to this problem.  
11.3.1 Other concerns with generics and patented products  
Even after the patent right has expired patent holders have the advantage of name recognition, 
consumer confidence and relations with the medical staff that prescribe pharmaceuticals.
335
 This 
means that a patent holder may be able to sell their product at a higher price than justifiable to a 
large segment of the market even after the patent is expired, unless a country does not act to make 
the market more accessible to generic competitors. On the contrary it could be argued that 
competition desired to create lower price, can be created between patented products that are 
substitutable to one another, but it is clear that even if this might create some competition, it does 
not create the same price fall as when a generic enters the market and consequently does not have 
the same pro-competitive effects as the existence of generics does.
336
 From a social point of view, 
substitutable patented drugs are also an unnecessary use of resources, since the money invested in 
the R&D for a substitutable drug could have been used for other more socially beneficial causes.
337
  
11.4 Potential benefits from a weaker IP regulation than TRIPS 
Limited patent rights would be beneficial to two specific groups in the developing world: 
consumers in need of pharmaceuticals and domestic generic drug manufacturers.
338
  Consumers 
would benefit from lower prices and increased access, and drug manufacturers by being able to 
compete on a free market without the limitation of exclusive rights.  
11.4.1 Lower prices  
Weak patent regimes and increased competition can decrease prices on pharmaceuticals, thus create 
a more affordable health care. If generic production is encouraged, either through lack of limited 
patent protection, or through compulsory licenses, competition will rise and prices will fall.
339
 
Research has shown that prices for pharmaceutical drugs vary widely from one country to another 
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and that “direct price controls, bulk purchasing, promotion of the use of generics and abolishing 
patents” all have the effect of lowering prices.340 A huge factor to the price differences is the 
existence of, or lack of, a national drug policy.
341
 If developing countries can manage to form 
effective national drug policies, they will be a lot closer to the goal of more affordable health care. 
Illustrative examples from the effects of measures like this can be found in Canada, India and 
Argentina. Canada used a compulsory licensing system in 1983 which had tremendous effects on 
pharmaceutical prices.
342
 The average price of compulsorily-licensed drugs sold in Canada was 
approximately half the price of the US price for the same drugs. India adopted price controls and 
only acknowledged process patents, which turned Indian drug prices from among the highest in the 
world to among the lowest, while Argentina simply did not offer patents, and drove down the prices 
considerably.
343 
It is hard to argue with the fact that generic producers creates lower prices, not even 
the industry denies it, but high prices are still defended with the argument that pharmaceutical drug 
manufacturers have to regain their investments.  
11.6 Compulsory licenses – not enough protection? 
Art 31 of TRIPS allow for unauthorized use of existing patents by government or governmentally 
approved third parties in certain circumstances and is a highly controversial provision. Its virtues 
and effects have been argued for a long time.  
11.6.1 Compulsory licenses and the Uruguay round  
During the Uruguay round, the questions of compulsory licenses was central and stirred up 
emotion. Developing countries on the rise, such as Brazil and Korea, strongly argued in favor of 
compulsory licenses, while most of the developed world try to narrow down this exception as much 
as possible, for example by limiting a compulsory license to the domestic market.
344
 During a 
meeting in 1990, a group of developing countries, with Brazil and India as leaders, made a strong 
move for the inclusion of compulsory licenses as well as exceptions to patentability in protection of 
public interest, health or nutrition.
345 
This organized pressure from the developing world forced the 
rest of the world to, at least partially, cave in to their demands. 
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11.6.2 Potential benefits of compulsory licenses 
Compulsory licenses have proven to be a very useful way of enhancing access to drugs that are 
crucial when fighting global health challenges, but normally are restricted due to patent 
protection.
346
 Compulsory licenses normally open up competition, which lowers prices, but it is in 
no way a universal remedy.
347
 Certain features to the provision limit its potential significantly. 
Normally a license applicant first has to negotiate with the patent holder for a voluntary license, 
which could be very time consuming. Additionally, once a manufacturer has been granted a 
compulsory license and gained access to the patent description, it might not provide enough 
information for them to be able to copy the drug, or a country might not have chemists qualified 
enough to copy the patent.
348
 It does however seem as if the mere threat of a potential compulsory 
licenses can enhance countries' bargaining positions. 
11.7 Moral arguments – a hypocritical developed world? 
When issuing a compulsory license, the WTO member in question set aside the commercial 
interests of the company that own the patent, in favor of some kind of social benefit for its 
population. Some argue that governments have a human right obligation to put the lives of their 
citizens before the commercial interest of foreign companies, and that this is reason enough to 
permit compulsory licenses.
349 
The developed world in general, and the US in particular, is 
extremely critical to developing countries issuing compulsory licenses for a certain drug during a 
public health crisis.
350
 Sometimes this point of view has been criticized for being hypocritical and 
that they would act the exact same way if the tables were turned.  
11.7.1 The Cipro case – a hypocritical example? 
An example of hypocrisy from the developed world can be found in the so called Cipro case 
concerning the US and the anthrax threat they were subject to in 2001.
351
 Faced with an imminent 
threat to its population, the US government decided to stock as much as possible of the drug that 
was considered to be the most efficient one against anthrax, which happened to be a drug called 
Cipro, manufactured by the pharmaceutical company Bayer's.
352
 In order to accomplish this goal 
governmental officials threatened Bayer and said that if they did not reduce the price on Cipro with 
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at least 50%, the government would simply take the drug from its source. Government officials also 
threatened to ask Congress to pass a bill that would remove any obligations the government 
normally would have to compensate Bayer for the fact that the government would simply ignore 
their patent right.
353
 This strategy was very successful and the US government managed to negotiate 
a really good deal.
354
 Despite their own actions when faced with this type of public health threats, 
they still try to pressure developing countries not to issue compulsory licenses to generic drug 
producers even though several public health threats could be partly neutralized.  
11.8 Is development really possible with strong IPRs?  
Can the developed world really demand strong IPRs from the developing world when they 
themselves build up their industry through imitation and weak IPRs? 
11.8.1 IP regulation and economic development  
Historically national IPRs have not been especially strong until a country reaches a certain level of 
economic development, but then they are strengthened. Current industrialized countries have 
generally had weak patent protection in key parts of their economy in order to gain an advantage 
when building up industrial and technological capacities.
355
 Basically all industrialized countries 
built up their capacity through imitation.
356
 Globalization and the spread of IPRs have created a 




11.8.2 Domestic industries 
Research suggests that domestic pharmaceutical industries can provide benefits to its nation that is 
not possible with multinationals simply because their objectives tend to coincide.
358
 Domestic 
companies are generally more likely to: promote development of local technology infrastructure; be 
in favor of generics; and adjust their technology to local needs, simply because they want to avoid 
dependence to foreign companies for their technology supply.
359
 Limited patent rights are a good 
way of creating a domestic pharmaceutical industry, but it does not provide a universal solution.
360
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Some studies even suggest that domestic manufacturers in developing countries eventually turn to 
the same type of anticompetitive behavior as many of the multinational pharmaceutical 
companies.
361 
Velásquez suggests that every developing country should incorporate a strategy on 




12 Attempts to comply TRIPS to with international public health 
obligations 
The WHO intended TRIPS to consider more than just IPR regulation, social consideration was also 
to be possible. Criticism that this attempt was not enough, has urged the WHO to adjust the 
provisions of TRIPS into a more health-friendly agreement more in compliance with existing 
international obligations for global health protection.  
12.1 Original provisions and exceptions for global health protection  
According to the WTO, the obligation in TRIPS to provide minimum IPRs is balanced out by 
provisions that allow for other considerations and a wider perspective.
363
 TRIPS assume that 
inventions and creativity should contribute to social and technological benefits, as well as an 
opportunity for governments to be flexible with the regulation when necessary to achieve social 
goals.
364
 The WTO also highlights that the TRIPS way to regulate IPRs can in fact promote social 
goals through the requirements of disclosure in exchange for protection, and the limited time period 
of protection.
365
 TRIPS offer the possibility of exceptions to exclusive rights and the institute of 
compulsory licenses specifically for health protection.
366
 Despite this original attempt to balance out 
the agreement, countries still found themselves stuck between the pressure to honor international 
IPRs, and their wishes to uphold strategies on how to fight public health problems.  
12.1 1 Brazil and access to HIV/Aids drugs - Illustrative example of a conflict 
between TRIPS and the protection of public health  
Since 1996, Brazil has had a governmental policy to guarantee free and universal access to ARV 
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 Brazil has a quite developed pharmaceutical industry and to reduce costs 
of the drug distribution, it has favored domestically produced drugs but high demand has forced 
some import.
368
 The policy has been very successful in reducing the number of deaths, hospital 
admissions and treatment costs but its continuation was threatened by the high costs of imports 
from international pharmaceutical companies.
369
 Even though Brazil has its own domestic 
provisions about compulsory licenses, it is a member of the WTO and has to follow the provisions 
of TRIPS and is thereby limited its regulation on compulsory licenses. However, the mere threat to 
break patents has proved to be a successful tool in negotiations with international pharmaceutical 
companies. In February 2001, Brazil made public that it intended to break patents on ARV drugs 
produced by the pharmaceutical companies Merck and Roche if they did not lower their prices.
370 
Faced with this threat Merck lowered its prices by 60%, but offers from Roche were considered too 
low.
371
 The US answered with a WTO panel request to judge the compatibility of Brazilian patent 
law with TRIPS. However, in April 2001, the UNHRC approved a resolution that established access 
to medical drugs during pandemics such as HIV/Aids, as a basic human right.
372
 After that the US 
withdraw its panel request, Roche lowered the prices on their drugs, and Brazil abandoned any 
plans to break the patent.
373
 This conflict likely contributed to an increased realization in developed 
countries that enormous challenges to global health, such as the AIDS pandemic, actually can be a 
threat to social and political stability and thereby national security, and thereby a new concern for 
public health issues. Shortly after the conflict in Brazil, the WTO took steps to try to prevent this 
from happening again.  
12.2 TRIPS and the Doha agenda    
At a Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar in 2001, the WTO members decided to launch a new 
round of trade negotiations, and to try to improve implementation of the already existing 
agreements; this entire plan is called the Doha Development Agenda.
374
 TRIPS was a hot topic for 
the agenda and the idea was to address three different concerns with the controversial IPR 
agreement: (1) how to deal with „non-violation complaints‟ - disputes due to a lost benefits even 
when no one has violated the agreement; (2) technology transfer to LDCs; and (3) TRIPS and its 
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impact on public health.
375
 A separate declaration on how to treat TRIPS in the context of public 
health was a common goal for the member states at the 2001 conference, but they were in no way 
united on what this declaration should entail.
376
 The developing countries were relatively united in 
trying to clarify a more limited scope of IP protection for pharmaceuticals, while developed 
countries advocated for an interpretation that in no way would undermine the IP protection that 
TRIPS provides.
377
 The conference eventually resulted in three statements that in some way 
concerned IP: (1) the Ministerial Declaration to launch a new round, more commonly called the 
Doha Declaration; (2) a decision about implementation issues with special attention to LDC 
countries and their special needs
378
; and finally the most significant one in this context, a 
declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.
379
 The Doha round is still going on, thereby 
surfacing as the longest WTO round of negotiations so far, even longer than the Uruguay round. 
The WTO will probably face enormous difficulty trying to realize the DDA.  
12.2.1 The Doha Declaration 
This declaration is a ministerial interpretation of the TRIPS agreement with the main message that it 
is important to implement and interpret TRIPS in a way that supports public health, specifically by 
promoting access to pharmaceuticals, as well as encouraging new medicines.
380 
With consideration 
to the special needs of LDCs, the Doha declaration also extends the exemption on compliance 
regarding pharmaceutical patents for LDCs until January 1, 2016.
381
 
12.2.2 Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 
This specific declaration on TRIPS and Public Health emphasizes that TRIPS should not prevent 
WTO members from taking measures to protect public health, and that this should be a guiding 
principle for TRIPS interpretation.
382 
The declaration also affirms members‟ rights to use the 
agreement flexibly and clarifies how the flexible alternatives, such as compulsory licenses and 
parallel importing, can be used.
383
 Especially important is the fifth paragraph of the declaration that 
establishes that members have the freedom to determine what qualifies as a “national emergency or 
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other circumstances of extreme urgency”, when issuing compulsory licenses.384 The declaration 
provides some guidance and exemplifies public health crises “relating to HIV/Aids, tuberculosis, 
malaria and other epidemics, as an example of a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency”.385 Members‟ freedom also extends to the right to establish individual domestic 
provisions for exhaustion of IPRs. This means that if a national law says that an IPR is exhausted 
with the first legal sale anywhere in the world, the product can then be legally exported to a country 
that normally has a higher price on that product.
386
 Consequently, it is obvious that pressure from 
the developing world has pushed the WTO to reinterpret TRIPS into a more health friendly 
agreement than before. It does not however go so far as recognizing health as a human right, the 
Doha declaration in fact explicitly declines to do so.
387
  
12.2.2.1 Legal significance or political strategy?  
The formal legal significance of the Doha declaration, compared to the rest of the WTO agreements 
is relatively uncertain. The WTO members have agreed to officially amend the Declaration into the 
TRIPS agreement so that the declaration itself would receive the same legal standard, and be relied 
upon in any potential DSU conflict, but this decision is yet to be ratified of a sufficient number of 
members.
388
 The question is if the declaration nevertheless could be a legally binding document. 
The Marrakesh agreement provides information on what is to be considered legally binding under 
the WTO system. Since the ministerial conference is the highest decision making authority in the 
WTO, a ministerial decision is an obvious example of a legal binding document.
389
 Declarations are 
not explicitly included as a ministerial decision, but neither are they excluded, so the Doha 
Declaration could very well be seen as a ministerial decision.
390
 The fact that some documents 
during the negotiation rounds, contrary to the declaration on TRIPS and public health, actually were 
named decisions, thereby clearly indicating a binding intention, contradicts the theory that 
declarations are to be considered binding ministerial decisions.
391
 On the other hand, when a 
declaration is taken under consensus, like this one was, there is more reason to believe that it could 
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be legally binding and not only of political significance.
392
 The only obvious conclusion to draw 
from this is that the legal standing of the Declaration is uncertain.   
12.2.2.2 Interpretive weight  
Even if the declaration is not seen as an official and binding WTO decision, it could have important 
weight as an interpretive document relevant to a dispute settlement.
393
 The declaration could be 
considered as a “subsequent agreement regarding interpretation” or subsequent practice, according 
to art 31.3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is the primary tool for 
international agreement interpretation. Regardless if the declaration is classified as legally binding 
or merely a strategic political stand point; it likely has so much weight and influence that there will 
not be any complaints within the WTO dispute settlement system on any issues in the declaration.
394
  
12.2.3 2003 WTO decision/waiver and 2005 amendment  
Even after the Doha declaration, it was still very hard for the LDCs to access drugs, simply because 
they did not have the capability to manufacture themselves, and because TRIPS, article 31 only 
allow compulsory licenses “predominantly for the supply of the domestic market”. The Declaration 
on TRIPS and Public health did not solve this problem. It did recognize it, stating in paragraph 6 
that “WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector 
could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS agreement” 
and instructed the TRIPS council to “find an expeditious solution to the problem”.395 These 
instructions resulted in the 2003 decision by the WTO members to increase the possibilities to 
import generics that had been manufactured under a compulsory license, for countries that could not 
manufacture themselves. The decision waived three provisions in the TRIPS agreement: (1) article 
31 f , which means that any contracting party now has the right to export generics manufactured 
under a compulsory license in order to meet the needs of an importing country; (2) the obligation of 
remuneration was also waived for the importing side in order to avoid double payment; the 
exporting side still has to pay remuneration; (3) export constraints were waived for developing 
countries and LDCs so that they can export within regional trade agreements.
 396
 All LDC countries 
are free to use these waivers at any time and upon notification to the TRIPS council, but all eligible 
importing members are also welcome to take advantage of these provisions.
397
 The remuneration 
                                               
392 Page 208, Charnowitz 
393 Page 208, Charnowitz 
394 Page 219, Carmen Otero  
395 Page 320-321, Dutfield, Suthersanen 
396 2003 WTO decision/waiver – WT/L/540 and Corr.1 
397 Paragraph 2, page 321, Dutfield, Suthersanen  
 72 
 
that the exporter is now solely responsible for must take into account the “economic value to the 
importing member of the use that has been authorized in the exporting member.”398 When the 
council decision of 2003 implemented these waivers, they were intended to be interim with the goal 
to amend them to TRIPS. A formal decision to amend the changes to the agreement was reached in 
December 2005
399
, but is yet to enter into force. The decision needs to be formally accepted by 2/3 
members to enter into force and currently there are 28 countries plus the EU that have formally 
accepted it.
400
  The deadline to accept the decision was originally 1 Dec, 2007, but after two 
extensions, it is now 31 Dec, 2011.
401
  
12.3 Effects of the decisions following the Declaration 
The most significant impact that the 2003 waiver and 2005 decision has had on the promotion of 
global health, is that it enables countries to export essential drugs and medicines manufactured 
under a compulsory license to a country in desperate need for the drugs, but without necessary 
manufacturing capacities. The ratification rate has been very low so far and there are not many 
examples of countries that have taken advantage of this opportunity. One probable cause to this is 
that there really is no good way of prevent re-export of these cheaper compulsory license 
manufactured drugs since TRIPS allow parallel import and rely on the principle of exhaustion.
402
 
This means that drugs exported to a LDC in crisis, can be legally re-exported to any country and 
sold just as cheap there and thereby undermining the patented drug in that country. It is likely that 
the problem of re-export is a major cause to why so few member states have accepted the decision 
so far. Another reason could be that developing countries know that many powerful developed 
countries do not encourage usage of the provisions and therefore resist the opportunities due to fear 
of retaliation. Further cause could be that despite attempts to simplify, the process is still quite 
complex and countries that need generic drugs the most hade a hard time with the administrative 
process. Clearly this is not a completely uncomplicated process. The 2005 amendment is not a 
perfect attempt to improve access to lifesaving drugs in the most remote parts of the world, but 
never the less a genuine attempt and a step in the right direction. Unfortunately recent FTA's have a 
tendency to include chapters regulating IPRs in a different way than the TRIPS amendment, which 
seem to reflect a deliberate attempt to undermine anything that the international community can 
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 The next chapter will examine how this is possible, why it is done, and 
what potential consequences this could have. 
13 Recent developments; a TRIPS-plus strategy 
It is clear that recent development within the WTO IPR system has been towards a stronger 
consideration of health protection, mainly pushed by the developing world. It is also clear that the 
developed world fear that multilateral IPR protection will be so diminished that their interests are 
no longer sufficiently protected. Many developed countries, the US in particular, have taken the 
position that TRIPS was insufficient protection and advocate even stronger IPRs. Due to this 
division in the multilateral arena, the recent trend has been a movement towards more bilateral 
agreements between developed and developing countries on stronger and more comprehensive IPR 
protection than the TRIPS agreement provide. This is the so called the TRIPS-plus strategy. The 
burning question is if the multilateral strategy to increase access to medicine by decreasing the 
power of strong IPRs through extending the scope of the compulsory licenses, is working, or if it is 
neutralized by the bilateral TRIPS-plus strategy that some industrialized countries are currently 
enacting.  
13.1 Why a TRIPS plus strategy through bilateral agreements? 
Most developing countries believed that the TRIPS agreement would be the final stop for 
international regulation of IPRs and that by giving this concession; they would avoid further 
pressure from the developed world.
404
 Many developed countries, the US in particular, did promise 
not to act unilaterally or bilaterally if the Uruguay round of negotiations would result in a 
multilateral trading system.
405
 Despite the fact that the Uruguay round resulted in a very 
comprehensive multilateral trading system, the US as well as the EU, have entered into a number of 
bilateral trade agreements with developing countries and LDCs outside the multilateral forum.
406
 
After seemingly quite unsuccessful WTO negotiations during the Doha round, for example in 
Cancun in 2003, the USTR actually took an opposite position compared to previous statements and 
declared that the US would continue to pursue unilateral and bilateral initiatives for, among other 
things, stronger IPR protection.
407 
Despite the Uruguay round promises, it is fairly obvious that 
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large parts of the developed world only saw TRIPS as the first step towards a more comprehensive 
global protection of IPRs more or less equivalent to Western standards of IPR protection.
408
  
13.1.1 Multilateral arena closed 
Since the developing countries were so successful in organizing themselves towards further 
development of IPR protection within the WTO system, and actually even managed to limit its 
reach in favor of health protection, it is likely that developed countries believed that international 
achievements no longer could be achieved multilaterally, and that bilateralism and trade sanctions 
were the only remaining alternatives.
409
 These bilateral agreements generally have a regular trade 
issue as its main concern, but incorporate provisions highlighting the importance of IPR protection 
with the “highest international standards and levels of protection”; effectively demanding stronger 
IPR protection than TRIPS require and thereby causing the so called TRIPS-plus effect.
410
 Some go 
so far as to say that most developing countries have been pressured or coerced to enter into these 
agreements by its industrialized counterparts.
411
 True or not, it is clear that bilateral and regional 
agreements have been a successful way to get developing countries to agree to IPR protection 
beyond the requirements of TRIPS.
412
  
13.2 What is a TRIPS-plus strategy? 
Since the TRIPS agreement require a minimum standard of IPR protection, any subsequent bilateral 
agreement where WTO members are involved can only create stronger IPR protection than 
TRIPS.
413
  This means that any agreement of that kind is generally part of a TRIPS-plus strategy. A 
TRIPS-plus provision can both increase the protection level for right holders, as well as reduce a 
limitation or exception given by the TRIPS agreement.
414
 Pressure to interpret the TRIPS agreement 
as narrow as possible, or to disregard transition period privileges, could also be seen as a TRIPS-
plus effects.
415
  These TRIPS-plus provisions generally reduce the ability that developing countries 
have to protect different public interests.
416
 This means that attempts to enhance global IPR 
protection further than the TRIPS agreement could seriously damage developing countries in their 
effort to achieve technological progress and development, and thereby counteract any positive 
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effects from measures taken in protection of global health within the WTO.
417
  
13.2.1 Examples of TRIPS-plus strategies 
There is no single definition of what a TRIPS-plus effect is since it differs from country to country, 
but some examples can be given of how bilateral agreements can increase a country's IPR 
protection:  
 By extending patent and copyrights to new kind of subject matters418;  
 By disclaiming rights (provided by the TRIPS agreement) to exempt certain things from 
their national IPR regime, for example plant and animal patents from their national patent 
laws.
419
 Sometimes the exceptions that developing countries disclaim or narrow are even 
things that are still exempt in US or European IPR regimes
420
;  
 By extending the minimum time period of protection. For example protection of industrial 
designs, have in many cases been extended from the TRIPS requirement of 10 years, to a 
fifteen year term of protection;
421
  
 By including a requirement to join a specific international IP agreement, such as a WIPO 
treaty with TRIPS plus provisions, into a trade agreement;
422
  
 By strengthening already strong TRIPS enforcement provisions or by including other 
dispute settlement procedures than the WTO DSB system for the interpretation and 
implementation of that specific agreement. This is often changed to dispute settlement 
through arbitration, which forces weaker states to solve disputes in a much more 
sophisticated environment than they have resources for.
423
 
13.3 Forum management - multilateral v bilateral trade agreements 
Recent development has shown a trend towards bilateral FTAs over multilateral agreements for 
international trade cooperation, especially in the IP area. This trend is an example of a strategy 
called forum management, or forum shifting, which basically means that countries are aware of the 
fact that the place of negotiations can have a huge impact on the outcome, and therefore tries to 
steer the negotiations towards a forum which they believe can provide the best outcome.
424
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Basically all countries have a forum management strategy, but in general only strong countries can 
fulfill it, while weaker countries need to cooperate in groupings to even have a chance of successful 
forum management.
425 
Both multilateral cooperation and PTAs can liberalize trade by helping 
governments resist political pressure from domestic interest groups that desire more trade restrictive 
policies.
426
 So what is the difference between bilateral and multilateral trade cooperation and what 
consequences could the trend towards bilateralism have?  
13.3.1 Multilateralism  
The WTO, as the world‟s leading trade organization, is based on multilateralism. With its basic 
principles of non-discrimination and MFN, it seeks non-preferential trading arrangement for all 
members. This is to be contrasted to any PTA that provides advantages only to its parties. Basically, 
multilateral trade agreements seek global trade liberalization. A multilateral agreement includes a 
much larger number of countries, which causes longer period of negotiations, especially when the 
countries strive to achieve consensus as within the WTO system. The long negotiations are however 
a natural consequence from the comprehensive and complex nature of a multilateral agreement.
427 
Some argue that trade liberalization through multilateral agreements does not create as high income 
increase and growth rate as PTAs do, but since the evidence of growth and income increase is much 
more solid and reliable when it comes to multilateral liberalization compared to liberalization 
through PTAs, this statement is still very controversial.
428 
Multilateralism is also considered the best 
way to avoid a prisoner‟s dilemma.429  
13.3.2 Bilateralism, regionalism and PTAs 
PTAs, bilateral and regional trade agreements reduce barriers to trade on a preferential, rather than 
universal, basis and their increase since the 1980's is highly significant to global trade 
development.
430
 Members to a PTA are generally geographically natural trading partners, such as 
NAFTA and the EU.
431
 The bilateralism trend causes block formation between countries and 
parallel negotiations to the multilateral cooperation. There are a number of explanations and reasons 
to why states enter into PTAs: (1) want to manage market power; (2) desire to raise income and 
growth; (3) as a reaction to delayed multilateral negotiations; (4) because it can be beneficial to 
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different political interests; (5) as an insurance against foreign protection, and finally; (6) it can 
provide them with enhanced security.
432
 Regardless of what reasons a single state may have to enter 
into a PTA, they have different consequences in the international arena.  
13.3.2.1 Benefits of PTAs and bilateralism  
Trade liberalization through bilateral and regional negotiations are generally considered to be faster 
and cheaper than multilateral trade liberalization, especially considering the consensus requirement 
within the WTO system that often causes long delays.
433
 PTAs have shown trade liberalizing effects 
in the shape of actual tariff reductions or MFN tariff reduction.
434
 The more members to a PTA, the 
more it can gain trade liberalization. PTAs are also valuable because they allow groups of countries 
to negotiate and regulate on trade issues beyond what was possible to agree on multilaterally.
435
 In 
some cases, such as the issue of IP regulation, regional negotiations have opened up and paved the 
way for multilateral negotiations.
436
 PTAs that are open to include developing countries could 




13.3.2.2 Drawbacks with non-global trade liberalization 
International cooperation on a smaller, preferential basis is not without its own complications. The 
negotiations are not always fast and smooth just because there are fewer participants, they can also 
be delayed when the parties disagree on complex issues.
438
 And even though regional agreements 
and closer economic integration can benefit its participants, it can sometimes hurt the trade interests 
of other countries.
439 
From a global trade liberalization perspective, larger PTAs are more 
problematic because their members have a greater incentive to increase tariffs against non-members 
and cause a situation of a prisoner‟s dilemma, unlike a multilateral system that is as globally 
beneficial as possible.
440
 When a PTA grows, it gains more economic and political power and could 
potentially be so strong that is could be able to block multilateral agreements that hurt some of their 
members.
441
 Consequently, the greatest danger with bilateralism and PTAs is that it could 
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undermine incentives and political support for multilateral and global trade liberalization. Non-
global trade liberalization creates the problem of multiple and overlapping jurisdictions, as well as 
draws attention and resources from the multilateral negotiations.  
13.3.3 Bilateralism - complement or competition to multilateralism in the trade 
context? 
The reason as to why bilateralism is a controversial issue is that it causes both trade liberalization 
and trade distortion at the same time. Economic integration between the members in a PTA 
contributes to trade liberalization, but at the same time a PTA causes economic distortion by 
discriminating against non-members. Bilateralism has mostly been the forum management strategy 
of the US and the EU, even though the US has been slightly more aggressive.
442
 It is however very 
unlikely that these two huge trade actors would abandon the multilateral arena completely. It is 
much more probable that their forum management strategy is to push stronger IPRs in as many 
forums as possible.
443
 So the key question in the debate on international cooperation is if 
bilateralism, regionalism and PTAs compete with multilateral trade liberalization, or if it can be 
seen as a complement to multilateral cooperation? A PTA or customs union between members 
within the WTO would, due to its inherent discriminatory nature, technically violate the 
fundamental MFN principle.
444
 Art XXIV of GATT provides an exception that nevertheless makes 
it possible. As long as free trade prevails and a PTA formation does not increase barriers to trade 
with other members, the WTO allows it. The crucial requirement is that trade between a non-PTA 
member and a PTA member cannot be any more restrictive.
445
 This provision is however not very 
efficiently enforced and a clarification of under what conditions members may enter into a PTA has 
been an important topic during the Doha round. A clarification and strengthening of this provision 
could be an important part solution to the prisoner's dilemma problem.
446
 Consequently, the WTO is 
not completely against regional liberalization, despite its potential threats to the multilateral system. 
The official view of the WTO is that “regional integration should complement the multilateral 
trading system, not threaten it.”447 Since 1996 the WTO has a RTA committee in place with the 
mission to examine regional trade groups, evaluate their compliance with WTO rules, and try to 
predict how they will affect the multilateral trading system, as well as how the relationship between 
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regional and multilateral agreements should be treated.
448 
Additionally, regionalism does not always 
have to cause a prisoner's dilemma. An example of successful regional trade liberalization is the 
EU: a customs union that has eliminated internal tariffs but at the same time maintained the volume 
of trade with the rest of the world. Under such circumstances, the union will benefit from trade 
liberalization without causing harm to its non-members.
449
 In some cases regionalism and PTAs can 
actually promote multilateral trade liberalization. By weakening the position of domestic lobbyists 
that seek trade protectionism, strengthen export lobbies and reduce internal tariff rates, they can 
help to level out the playing field and prepare its members for further and more widespread 
liberalization.
450 
In sum, there is no simple or obvious answer to what kind of international trade 
cooperation and agreement that can produce the very best solution. What kind of negotiations and 
type of agreement for each specific situation is most likely a result of a cost-benefit analysis, where 
regionalism is preferred when the costs of multilateral negotiations are considered too large in 
relation to its expected benefits?
451
  
13.4 Possible consequences for the developing countries from the 
TRIPS plus strategies 
So what impact does the trend towards bilateralism and PTAs in the area of international IP 
regulation have on developing countries and LDCs? Generally these agreements are bilateral with a 
country-by-country approach basically just adding more provisions on top of the requirements from 
multilateral agreements.
452
 Every accomplished bilateral agreement can thereafter be used as a basis 
and reference for negotiations with another country, giving the TRIPS-plus strategy a very 
comprehensive effect.
453
 Developing countries are widely considered to be pressured into these 
bilateral TRIPS-plus agreements by the developed world through threats of trade sanctions and aid 
suspensions.
454
 This strategy is possible with the help of vague provisions in the TRIPS agreement 
that open up the possibility to regulate on different interpretations of the agreement.
455
 By 
systematically pushing bilateral agreements on developing countries, the developed world, with the 
US and the EU as frontiers, has created an enormous negotiation advantage compared to the 
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developing countries that basically cannot control the continuing development single-handedly.
456
  
The developing world can try to resist this kind of systematic pressure through regional alliances, 
but often the penetration of these alliances is a deliberate strategy by the developed world.
457 
The 
recent wave of bilateral agreements can be seen as a part of a competitive liberalization policy by 
the developed world. This basically means that the developed world believes that the best way to 
gain liberalization is to activate unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures simultaneously; they 
believe that they are both complementary and mutually reinforcing.
458
 In the TRIPS-plus strategy 
context, this means that bilateral agreements are pushed to create a competitive environment 
between the developing countries, which the developed world hope will stimulate equal result in a 
different market.
459
 If one developing country submits to the pressures for stronger IP protection it 
automatically becomes more attractive to the investments of, and trade relations with, the 
industrialized world. If the rest of the developing world does not want to lose this business and 
these investments, they are almost forced to follow in its footsteps despite any unwanted 
consequences that may follow. What these bilateral agreements have done is basically to shift the 
IPR debate from the multilateral arena of the WTO to a much less transparent state-to-state forum. 
The bilateral agreements are also exempt from the reach of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, 




13.4.1 WIPO of new importance in a TRIPS plus strategy?  
The TRIPS-plus strategy is actually being pushed in the multilateral context as well as the bilateral. 
Negotiation processes are currently taking place in the WIPO framework and are likely to result in 
agreements with TRIPS-plus standards.
461
 The biggest fear with these negotiations is that they will 
result in treaties that basically eliminate, or severely diminish, any flexibility that developing 
countries currently have to implement IPRs in a way that is reconcilable with their development 
goals.
462
 In order to keep some development perspective and not solely a business perspective on 
international IPRs, it is important to: increase developing countries participation and influence in 
WIPO, make room for development oriented organizations, thoroughly define WIPO's mandate 
from the UN, and assure that WIPO cannot be pressured by huge industrial players lobbying for a 
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 Through increased access to expertise from NGOs or private 
individuals, developing countries have been able to give more realistic and technically correct 
proposals, both to WIPO and to the WTO when it comes to taking such interests as public health 
into account in international IP regulation.
464
 With this business oriented development in mind, both 
the developing world and development organizations probably need to offer WIPO even stronger 
attention than what is currently done. 
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14 Discussion and Conclusions 
The main purpose of this thesis was to analyze (i) if developing countries actually can reach their 
development potential with current international agreements on IPR protection; (ii) the connection 
between IPRs and global health; (iii) how well the remedies implemented to comply IPR regulation 
with the protection of global health has worked, and; (iv) what implications the recent trend towards 
more comprehensive bilateral agreements in protection of IP might have on this debate. In this final 
and conclusive part of the thesis I will present my own thoughts on the problems these issues have 
presented throughout the thesis, and the difficulties I believe they will present to the world, as well 
as offer some thoughts on how international cooperation and regulation on trade, IPRs and global 
health could, or maybe even should, proceed.  
14.1 Problems with global health protection in the trade context 
Through the course of this thesis, a number of problematic issues have been identified that I intend 
to comment on briefly in this chapter.  
14.1.1 Overlapping mandates and weak authority for health protection  
Health protection has an enormous disadvantage compared to trade and IPR regulation when it 
comes to governance. The united organizational structure of the WTO gives it the strong and 
persuasive features necessary to act on a multilateral level and achieve solutions with a wide 
consensus basis. They also have the benefit of receiving basically all resources that every country 
dedicates to trade and IPR regulation. On the contrary, protection of global health is scattered on 
many different organizations and actors, which creates a lot more difficulty in managing the tasks 
onto the appropriate organization. Since the resources for health protection is limited, they often end 
up competing against each other instead of complementing each other‟s missions.  
14.1.2 Health not recognized as a human right  
If the world is serious in wanting to eradicate global health problems and place the health issue on 
equal standing with any trade concerns I also believe that it is crucial to give global health the status 
of a human right that it so well deserves. Progress has been made, the promotion of global health 
can almost be claimed to be a guiding principle for interpretation of WHO agreements, but it is not 
  
enough. Real results require a comprehensive action plan. In many circumstances, global health is 
considered a human right. If this was a universal truth, it would not be too hard to argue that a 
human right, such as access to lifesaving drugs, should always trump an economic argument, such 
as the need to recoup investments in research and development. But this is not a universally 
recognized right, in fact the context of trade, many countries have specifically denied this right, 
which makes the conflict somewhat imprecise. With no real international obligation, some would 
probably consider the right to health to be nothing but a moral argument. Combined with the fact 
that there is a very poor coordination of efforts to protect public health and many overlapping 
mandates to international health regulation, international trade regulation has the upper edge in any 
conflict.  
14.1.3 Weak enforcement for social rights v strong enforcement within the WTO 
It is however not enough that health is recognized as a human right if the right cannot be properly 
enforced. I strongly believe that it is essential to give global social rights the same strong and 
forceful enforcement mechanisms as rights given in global trade agreements. I believe that the 
world has proven that it does not have enough respect for the fact that all international agreements 
rely on the fundamental principle of international law, pacta sunt servanda - the content of the 
agreement shall be respected by all parties to the agreement. If an international agreement does not 
have a strong enforcement mechanism, it is very easy for its parties to disregard from compliance 
when it does not suit them to comply. Even if the entire international community were to recognize 
health as a human right from the number of international document that, if nothing else, at least are 
aspirational, these agreements, covenants and declarations generally do not have a strong 
enforcement mechanism. So when faced with the conflict between an aspirational obligation 
without an enforcement mechanism, and a 'harder' obligation from a binding trade agreement with a 
very strong enforcement mechanism, it is not hard to see that the trade obligation is much more 
likely to prevail. As we have seen, the enforcement possibility is one of the main reasons to why the 
industrialized world pushed for an IPR regulation within the WTO system instead of a separate 
international context such as WIPO. If we keep building strong enforcement mechanisms for the 
'harder' commercial international undertakings but at the same time almost unpunished can avoid 
strict compliance to the 'softer' social obligations, it is like international law ranks its own regulation 
into different categories – the ones that are worth ensuring compliance with and the ones that really 
only serve as guiding principles. And guiding principles, in all its glory, comes with its limitations. 
Even though it is excellent that some fundamental principles in protection of human rights and 
social responsibility pervade through all international cooperation, it is still not enough if we 
  
seriously want to prevent the worst distributional effects of free trade in a market that is not 
completely free competition.  
14.1.4 Different attitudes on IP protection  
It is evident that developing and developed countries have very different attitudes towards IP 
protection, and thereby very different ways of looking at the TRIPS agreement. Some countries 
have the approach that TRIPS was as far as they could possibly stretch in terms of IP regulation, 
while others believe that this is only a step on the way towards a much more comprehensive 
multilateral regulation. This is a profound difference in the fundamentals of IP protection that does 
not offer a simple solution or is very likely to change as long as there are developing countries.  
14.1.5 Uncertain legal significance of health protective measures  
Recently, there has been more multilateral consideration to health protection within the IPR context, 
most likely after groups of developing countries have organized and pushed the issues during the 
Doha round. These considerations manifest themselves in the health protective amendment to 
TRIPS taken to prevent the health damaging effects of the TRIPS agreement by widening the right 
to use compulsory licenses and simplify the export of generics. The amendment is definitely a step 
in the right direction, but due to a lack of sufficient ratification, the amendment has an unclear legal 
significance within the WTO system and it is uncertain what weight the amendment would carry in 
a dispute settlement.  
14.1.6 TRIPS plus strategy towards bilateral agreements  
Even if the amendment to TRIPS with more multilateral consideration to health protection would 
work, there is still the huge issue of the development towards bilateral IPR agreements, pushed by 
strong developed countries that believe that TRIPS does not offer enough IPR protection and try to 
find a new forum for negotiations. TRIPS plus strategies seriously threaten all multilateral efforts to 
create a global IPR regulation more considerate to global health.  
14.1.7 Partial liberalization not beneficial for development 
Economic evidence show that trade liberalization contributes to economic development by growth 
enhancement, which generally is a prerequisite for social development, but not enough to improve 
global health equality. To achieve sustainable trade liberalization, it is important to start to 
implement 'healthy' international trade policies. It is also highly necessary to assure that the 
international trade agreements that contribute to liberalization actually are advantageous to all 
countries that participate and not just to an elite few. If trade liberalization does not contribute to a 
  
wide economic development that reduces poverty and raises income, it will not promote public 
health in general. This is one of the reasons as to why bilateral trade agreements and PTAs are not 
as beneficial to growth and development as a multilateral agreement is. A multilateral agreement 
simply works on a broader arena with a wider scope and authority and can reach a wider circle of 
people. Economic evidence does not really suggest anything else than that PTAs at its best does not 
hurt non-members. It is per definition only trade liberalizing to a limited number and not in any way 
beneficial to non-members.  
14.1.8 Limited power of the WTO 
Despite the fact that the trend towards more bilateral cooperation could be a significant threat to the 
authority of the WTO, the organization is probably not very likely to go rough on members that 
enter into bilateral agreements on IPRs. The WTO is in a very delicate situation with the so far quite 
unsuccessful Doha agenda and will probably not risk upsetting powerful members too much 
because if members start to pull out of the WTO, it could threaten the very existence of the 
organization and I believe that IP is probably considered a minor area within the WTO compared to 
the rest of the free trade agreements and it is more likely that the GATT and GATS provisions are 
considered to be so important that they need to be protected at any cost, it is too important to keep 
the core trade agreements to get into a fight about the compliance of bilateral IP agreements at this 
moment. Maybe if the Doha round eventually turn into something substantial, the WTO will yet 
again have the authority to push for a stricter compliance from all members and a more clarified 
view on how to treat bilateral competition. But until then, the fragile WTO will not go too hard on 
bilateral agreements in conflict with WTO principles due to fear of commitment. I think that the 
WTO will be very pragmatic and argue that regionalism is not that bad, and try to see the positive 
effects of it. If not, the WTO will at least try to put a positive spin on it, simply because the WTO 
thinks that regional agreements are not going away, they are hard to prevent, and the WTO is afraid 
that members will drop out if they are not allowed to continue with regional or bilateral agreements. 
Considering the latest development in the Doha round, which has been quite unsuccessful in 
reaching sufficient consensus for an agreement, there might be some truth to this. It is probably 
crucial for the WTO to find a way to enforce this demand for no less favorable treatment for 
members and regulate WTO members‟ use of regionalism in a way that is clear and does not repel 
any members.   
14.1.9 WIPO as a potential stronger actor in the arena  
Considering the structure of the WTO and the difficulties to form new agreement with the 
consensus approach, I also believe that WIPO is likely to become a stronger player again. Despite 
  
the inclusion of IPRs into the WTO umbrella, industrialized countries have kept the option of using 
IPR negotiations within WIPO as a part of their forum management strategy. They needed to keep 
the door open for other negotiation forums if the WTO and TRIPS did not satisfy their needs. 
Unfortunately it is not as easy for the developing countries to organize within WIPO. Their limited 
resources for multilateral are likely to be put into the WTO more than WIPO since this is where 
they have already invested a lot of time and energy and have a better chance of voicing their 
opinions. 
14.2 What could be done within the international community to better 
comply IP regulation with protection of global health?  
So they question really comes down to if it is possible to combine liberalized trade with strong IP 
rights and still expect the kind of social and economic development necessary to fulfill the goals 
and obligations of  international public health agreements? How can we find a way to regulate trade 
of intellectual property so that it contributes to sustainable trade liberalization?  
14.2.1 Future development and measures of the WTO  
WTO could try harder condemning bilateral agreements that do not agree with them, with the risk 
of losing parties. At the same time it could be a way for them to show strength and that the WTO 
will not go down without a fight. One possibility could be to try to improve health protection within 
other areas, for example try to reach an agreement on minimum safety conditions for labor within 
the member states, before a product may be exported. This is just as much a trade issue as IPRs 
were. It is fairly obvious that TRIPS the way it was originally interpreted was a big problem for 
developing countries. Recent years several steps have been taken to try to neutralize any bad effects 
that the agreement might have on public health policy. The problem still remains however what 
legal status these measures really have, they are not formally ratified as an amendment to TRIPS 
and therefore they are not subject to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. So a member could 
most likely not drag another member that is in non-compliance with the un-ratified TRIPS 
amendment in front of a DSU panel in order to prevent this non-compliance. Until the amendment 
is fully integrated to TRIPS, this is a huge issue, and fact of the matter is that we do not know if the 
amendment will ever be integrated into TRIPS since it is not certain that enough countries will 
ratify it. Nevertheless, if the amendment is ratified, some progress has been made to neutralize the 
unwanted effects on public policy but a huge issue still remains – the matter of regional or bilateral 
agreements. If powerful industrialized nations cannot keep a strong enough IP protection through 
the multilateral system, they will proceed pushing the issue through other channels until they have 
  
their way. The current multilateral trading system does not really have a good way of handling the 
presence of competing bilateral or regional agreements and it is my belief that the WTO does not 
really dare to take on the fight during current circumstances. I do not really think that it is a 
deliberate strategy from the WTO to play some kind of a double jeopardy by attempting to increase 
access with this exception for the least developed countries, but at the same time prevents this by 
allowing bilateral trade agreements. This feels like a strange strategy to me considering that 
regionalism can be such a forceful threat to multi-nationalism. Supporting regionalism and 
bilateralism too much would be like making itself superfluous as a strong future player on the 
international arena. I rather believe that the power position of the WTO is questioned enough 
considering its lack of progress during the current Doha round, and that it considers it necessary to 
allow the presence of bilateral and regional agreements on IP in order to keep some power in other 
trade issues. Unfortunately I do not think that this strategy will prevail. I believe that this type of 
power play will rather lead up to a short term loss, long term loss situation. I think that the WTO 
need to act strongly and forcefully and try limiting the potential harmful effects that bilateral and 
regional IPR agreements could have – the exact same effects as the ones the WTO itself has tried to 
prevent. Since it is mainly the rich and powerful industrialized members such as the US and the EU 
that are using their power as leverage to get developing countries to enter into these agreements, it 
is necessary to try to get the developing countries that oppose this kind of behavior organized so 
that they get enough power to put up a fight at the negotiation tables. It is also of the utmost 
importance that the Doha round gets a re-boost and is vitalized in some way. If there could come 
out one successful agreement in a nearby future, I think that would make a huge difference in 
regaining people's confidence in both the WTO and the multilateral system itself.  
14.2.2 Measures within areas of international cooperation for health protection  
The whole problem with international law and any kind of social ambitions that entails from it, is 
that basically everyone can agree in theory that this is a great goal or right, but when it comes down 
to actually delivering something most nations fall short. Everybody wants a share of the advantages 
that an agreement creates, but hardly anyone is prepared to pay the prize that committing to the 
obligations will entail. I personally believe that no significant change will happen unless health is 
recognized worldwide as a human right, the US ratifies the ICESCR and an effort is made to 
coordinate health protection with a strong enforcement mechanism so that the “softer” right in an 
agreement for social development can be given just as strong status as the provisions of a 
commercial agreement. I believe that the best way to do this is to work on getting the entire 
international community to recognize health as an inalienable human right with all the obligations 
  
that follow. Not just access to health care, but to everything that is a necessity to realize one's 
health. However, this is most likely somewhat of a utopia, and something that probably will not 
happen in a while. A first step in the mean time could be to consider protection of health as an 
interpretive principle, as there have been tendencies towards within the WTO system. This would 
allow for national variations in how to prioritize based on different resource availability, risk 
perceptions and balancing between other domestic goals.  
14.3 The crucial relationship between IPR regulation, trade and health 
protection  
The big policy question for IPR regulation is to learn how to deal with the tradeoff between higher 
prices today in exchange for innovation tomorrow, which basically is the argument from the 
industry. High R&D costs that new pharmaceuticals need, will lead to high prices for consumers so 
that the industry can recoup its investments. If sustainable trade liberalization is going to be a goal, 
it is absolutely crucial to create a competitive environment to counteract this negative price effect 
that IPRs have for consumers in developing countries. Even though the world sees a lot more active 
NGOs fighting for better global health and huge multinational companies take on a more active role 
in their CSR, it is still highly crucial that nations on a governmental level also take their 
responsibility if we are really serious in complying with the international agreements and 
undertakings in protection of health. Not only for pragmatic reasons such as it would be so much 
easier to trade with a country where the population is healthy enough to be educated and build up a 
functioning administrative and legal system, but also because it is the morally right thing to do. It is 
likely that the continuing development for health cooperation is increased public-private 
partnerships at both local and global level. Even though it is good that the attempt to improve global 
health receives more attention and more resources, there are some potential problems with this 
future. Besides the fact that global health strategies already struggle with bad coordination and 
overlapping mandates due to an abundance of actors, the international community does not have a 
good way of ensuring corporate compliance to international regulation. When the actors are states 
or cooperating states, there are still matters of international law that can be used as tools to force 
compliance onto disobedient states. It is evident that countries cannot reach their maximum 
development potential with strong IPRs. To achieve social development and global health, 
innovation and growth cannot be the only guiding principles. At the same time it is important to 
remember that some countries might try to use protection of public health as a cover for trade 
protectionism because they want to try to get a market advantage for their domestic industries. It is 
  
therefore important to find safeguards to prevent this kind of behavior. For example standards as to 
when certain protectionist measures are allowed and so on. In the words of Aristotle, “Wealth is 
evidently not the good we are seeking, for it is merely useful for the sake of something else.”465 In 
this case, increased wealth can, and should, become the tool to achieve global health and 
development. 
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